Evaluation of the EU-ASAC in Cambodia by -
South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse
for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons
Internacionalnih Brigada 56, 11 000 Belgrade, Serbia
Tel. (+381) (11) 344 6353  / Fax. (+381) (11) 344 6356
 URL: www.seesac.org / Email: info@seesac.org
South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse
for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons
SEESAC
Evaluation of the EU Small Arms and 
Light Weapons Assistance to the
Kingdom of Cambodia (EU-ASAC)
9 7 8 8 6 7 7 2 8 0 1 8 5
ISBN 86-7728-018-9 
The South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons 
(SEESAC) has a mandate from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Stability Pact for 
South Eastern Europe (SCSP) to further support all international and national stakeholders by strengthening 
national and regional capacity to control and reduce the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons, 
and thus contribute to enhanced stability, security and development in South Eastern and Eastern Europe.
For further information contact:
Head, SEESAC
Internacionalnih Brigada 56
11000 Belgrade
Serbia
Tel: (+381) (11) 344 6353
Fax:  (+381) (11) 344 6356
www.seesac.org 
Evaluation of the EU SALW Assistance to the Kingdom of Cambodia (EU-ASAC), SEESAC, 2006
This evaluation paper was researched and compiled by Adrian Wilkinson, Head SEESAC and Anya Hart-Dyke, SALW Awareness Officer SEESAC 
during 22 May – 08 June 2006.  The authors wish to acknowledge the technical assistance received from Mr David de Beer, Special Advisor 
to the European Commission and Project Manager EU-ASAC, and the EU-ASAC Team.  The evaluation team particularly appreciated the 
support and assistance provided by Tieng Saman, Consultant to EU-ASAC and formerly of the NGO Working Group for Weapons Reduction 
(WGWR), during the community participatory element of the evaluation. Acknowledgement must also be made to the in-country research 
conducted by the WGWR and the Small Arms Survey over the last three years, which has also contributed greatly to the work of the evaluation 
team in terms of impact data.  Finally, the team wishes to thank the Government of Cambodia for their cooperation and support during the 
evaluation.
 SEESAC 2006 – All rights reserved
ISBN: 86-7728-018-9 (Only if released widely outside the EU and member states representatives)
The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the European Union or the United 
Nations Development Programme.  The designations employed and the presentation of material in this publication do not imply the expression 
of the European Union or the United Nations Development Programme concerning 1) the legal status of any country, territory or area, or of 
its authorities or armed groups; or 2) concerning the delineation of its frontiers or boundaries. 
Evaluation of the EU Small Arms and Light Weaons  
Assistance to the Kingdom of Cambodia (EU-ASAC)
2nd Edition (2006-07-25)
iEvaluation of the EU Small Arms and Light Weaons 
Assistance to the Kingdom of Cambodia (EU-ASAC)
2nd Edition (2006-07-25)
Acronyms
ADHOC Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association (NGO)
CCCB Commune Council Capacity Building
CHRTF Cambodian Human Rights Task Force (NGO)
CIDH Cambodian Institute for Development and Human Rights (NGO)
CMAC Cambodia Mine Action Centre
CoC Code of Conduct
CSBM Confidence and Security Building Measures
CSO Civil Society Organization
DAC Development Assistance Committee (OECD)
EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EC  European Commission
EU  European Union
EU-ASAC EU Assistance on curbing Small Arms and light weapons in Cambodia
GTZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit GmbH
HHS Household Survey
IMAS International Mine Action Standards
ISO  International Standardization Organization
I&CD Institutional and Capacity Development
JCCP Japanese Centre for Conflict Prevention
JSAC Japanese Assistance Team for Small Arms Management in Cambodia
KII  Key Informant Interviews
LFA  Logical Framework Analysis
MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoD Ministry of Defence
MoEF Ministry of Economy and Finance
MoI  Ministry of Interior
NCWMR National Commission for Weapons Management and Reform
NGO Non Governmental Organisation
NIP  National Indicative Programme (EU and Cambodia)
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (DAC)
OKFDA O’Chloung Khmer Family Development Association (NGO)
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PRDC Provincial Rural Development Committee
RBM Results Based Management
RCAF Royal Cambodian Armed Forces
RKFA Rescue Khmer Farmers Association (NGO)
RMDS/G Regional Micro-Disarmament Standards and Guidelines (SEE)
SAA Small Arms Ammunition (Calibre 14.5mm and below)
SALW Small Arms and Light Weapons
SAPS SALW Perceptions Survey (Confirmatory)
SEESAC South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of SALW
TCO Technical Cooperation Office (EU, Phnom Penh)
ii
Evaluation of the EU Small Arms and Light Weaons  
Assistance to the Kingdom of Cambodia (EU-ASAC)
2nd Edition (2006-07-25)
UN  United Nations
UNDDA United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
VAT  Value Added Tax
VWCP Voluntary Weapons Collection Programme
WCP Weapons Collection Point
WED Weapons in Exchange for Development
WfD Weapons for Development
WGWR Working Group for Weapons Reduction
VMG Village Model Gardens
VMPF Village Model Poultry Farms
iii
Evaluation of the EU Small Arms and Light Weaons 
Assistance to the Kingdom of Cambodia (EU-ASAC)
2nd Edition (2006-07-25)
Executive Summary
Introduction
In 1998, after thirty years of war, genocide, internal conflict and 
civil disorder, the new Royal Government of Cambodia made its 
first serious attempt to tackle the problems caused by SALW in the 
country. The government recognised that the continued availability 
and proliferation of large quantities of illegal weapons, combined 
with inadequate national stockpile security, was major threat to the 
improving peace and stability in the country.  Armed violence, a lack 
of government control of weapons, the risks of political violence and 
the negative impact of weapons on social and economic development 
were all reasons to quickly develop a comprehensive response. The 
combination of poverty, crime and unemployment, coupled with a 
degree of political instability and public perceptions of insecurity, 
meant that voluntary weapons collection initiatives were always 
going to be a challenge. 
Addressing the proliferation and possession of SALW in Cambodia 
was therefore clearly a complex task. The Royal Government of 
Cambodia lacked the financial resources, technical experience, 
national capacity, infrastructure and operational procedures 
necessary for effective stockpile management and security.  Yet the Royal Government of Cambodia persuaded 
the international community of the governments’ commitment to maintaining control of the improving security 
situation, and this was backed up the commencement of activities on the ground.  It was therefore appropriate 
that the development of the EU-ASAC programme should be one of the first Joint Action initiatives established 
under the framework of the Common Foreign Security Policy.  The programme had relevance not only for the 
Royal Government of Cambodia, but also the European Union.
EU-ASAC began operations in April 2000, and over the next six years engaged in strengthening the legal 
framework, weapons collection, weapons destruction, stockpile management, the detection and clearance of 
illegal weapons caches, development of police capacity, NGO capacity development and SALW awareness.  It was 
a wide-ranging programme that responded to changing dynamics on the ground, and enjoyed a strong working 
relationship with the majority of partners and stakeholders.
Impact, effectiveness and efficiency
The very significant reduction in armed violence in 
Cambodia over the last seven years indicates that the 
EU-ASAC programme has had a positive impact on 
countering the proliferation of SALW, and has therefore 
also made a contribution towards the improvement 
of human security in the country. This impact alone 
justifies the support initiated under Joint Action 
1999/730/CFSP, and should also positively influence 
current and future EU engagement in similar SALW 
Control programmes elsewhere.  
From the perspective of effectiveness, the EU-ASAC 
programme has achieved its overall aim of providing 
technical support and assistance to the Royal 
Government of Cambodia initiative to counter the 
  The full title is: EU Assistance on curbing Small Arms and light weapons in Cambodia.
Cambodia
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Kep, Phnom Penh, and Kampong Som are municipalities
(krong) having status equal to that of provinces. 
 Impacts (Outcomes)
Percentage of estimated 1991 weapons taken 
under government control 82 %
Armed Violence (Homicide) Reduction 
(1998 - 2003) 70 %
Overall Homicide Rate Reduction 
(1998 - 2003) 55 %
Armed Robbery Reduction 
(1996 - 2004) 7 %
Variance in ‘Black Market’ Weapon Prices 
(Assault Rifle) + 440 %
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availability and proliferation of weapons within Cambodia.  EU-ASAC has fulfilled all major project obligations, 
and valuable lessons have been learned for future projects.  The destruction and logistic systems and structures 
developed by EU-ASAC are based on internationally accepted principles, norms or standards, and are now well 
understood by their local Cambodian partners and staff.  Indeed, many current international ‘best practices’ 
have been derived from the pioneering work conducted on SALW Control within Cambodia.
The Weapons for Development component of the 
programme initially consisted of two large-scale incentive 
based voluntary weapons collections.  The programme 
then refocused on to NGO delivery of incentives and 
supported a further nine small-scale activities. Although 
relatively few weapons were collected over the period of 
the WfD component, the improvement in perceived and 
real security in the targeted areas has been measurable. 
SALW (Weapons) collection has had a positive impact on 
individuals and communities, who have also benefited 
from much needed infrastructure development.
It is the opinion of the evaluation team that the programme 
was managed efficiently in terms of cost-benefits and 
value for money.  The costs per weapon destroyed were 
at the lower end of the ‘global market price’; and storage 
infrastructure development costs are realistic for the 
Cambodian marketplace.  The operational costs per 
weapon recovered in the WfD components ranged from 
US$ 42 (for mini-WfD activities) to US$ 122 (for large-
scale WfD activities).  Although this must not be the sole 
measure of success or impact, the figure does provide a 
degree of value for money when compared against ‘black 
market’ prices at that time of US$ 160 - 180.
In terms of the costs per weapon recovered from weapons 
caches, this is the first time that such a cost has been 
identified in terms of SALW control projects. Considering the time taken to locate caches, the methodology 
development, distances covered and search capability developed, the expenditure is realistic and value for 
money.
The programme team should be commended for delivering the projected outputs and capability for only 77% of 
the budgeted costs.  It would not have been possible to deliver more outputs or capability with the unexpended 
funds, as the programme manager had always to balance the currency exchange risks of the US Dollar against the 
Euro to ensure an overspend did not result.  During the period of the project there has been up to a 20% variance 
in exchange rates, and therefore a 77% delivery rate is more than acceptable under these circumstances.  The 
‘Activity Map’ (page v) indicates the range of locations and activities supported by EU-ASAC during the period of 
the project.
In terms of sustainability, both the RCAF and elements of the police now have appropriate safe and secure 
storage locations for the national stockpile of weapons, but more importantly, an effective stockpile management 
system for weapons has been developed and implemented.  Standing operating procedures have been developed, 
computerised weapon accounting systems developed and installed, and sufficient individuals have been trained 
on their use.  Providing these systems continue to be used as designed, then the risks of proliferation in the future 
have been significantly reduced.  Arms control legislation has been developed, and approved by parliament, and 
  Current international ‘best practices’ in the technical areas of EU-ASAC work are contained in IMAS 11.20, RMDS/G 05.20 and the OSCE 
BPG, which have clearly been implemented as far as was practically possible.
 Based on analysis of outputs achieved during 2000 - 2005, for which audited accounts were available.  These may change slightly once the 
financial accounts for the 2006 outputs have been formally audited.
 Office, communications and transport.
Effectiveness (Outputs)
Weapons Destroyed 142,871
Weapons Depots Constructed 45
Weapons Placed in Secure Storage 158,760
Weapons Collected 12,775
Weapons Caches Cleared 9
Incentive Delivery (Schools Built/Repaired) 8
Incentive Delivery (Water Wells) 275
Incentive Delivery (Bridges) 4
Efficiency (Outputs)3
Cost per Weapon Destroyed € 2.65
Storage Infrastructure Costs per Weapon € 10.83
Cost per Weapon Recovered (Caches) € 52.86
Administrative Costs4 (% of Expenditure) % 8.50
Expenditure against Budget for Capability 
Delivery % 76.70
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the effective implementation of this legislation should ensure that 
the use of illicit weapons as an enabler for armed violence would 
be constrained. Only effective implementation of this legislation can 
ensure the sustained reduction in armed violence that has been 
seen over the last seven years, but the indicators are that the Royal 
Government of Cambodia is politically committed to this.
The programme documentation did not always clearly identify results 
in terms of ‘impact’, and progress towards those results was hence 
difficult to measure both quantitatively and qualitatively.  Impact 
data is difficult to collect in Cambodia, and although in an ideal world 
support to the Royal Government of Cambodia in developing data 
collection and collation mechanisms would be highly desirable, the 
reality is that this could be a 10 year project in its own right; more 
resources would be committed to developing data mechanisms 
than in the practical SALW Control components on the ground. 
Notwithstanding that a results based management concept was not 
used as a primary means of focusing on component deliverables 
and impacts, the principles of the project management cycle were 
followed by the programme team.
The adoption of an annual funding mechanism constrained the ability of the EU-ASAC programme to deliver 
long-term WfD strategies, or to engage in any longer term activities to control weapons within Cambodia.  It is 
now generally accepted that impact of SALW Control programmes are mid- to long-term in nature and therefore 
should be supported by multi-year funding mechanisms.  (Indeed the very success of EU-ASAC shows the impact 
that sustainable funding can have - but it can be more efficiently and effectively committed if allocated on a 
multi-year basis).
Future synergies and needs
Although the link between armed violence and weapons was identified during the project conception phase, EU-
ASAC was not mandated to engage in countering the direct criminal use of weapons.  Therefore no activities, such 
as the development of a forensics or weapons intelligence capability, were included that could have addressed 
this threat.  Experience gained on other SALW Control interventions now suggests that this is an important 
component of a holistic SALW control strategy, and future EU supported interventions should also consider this 
component during programme development.
Further SALW Control support is still needed by the Royal Government of Cambodia, particularly in terms of; 
1) legislation implementation; 2) the development of an effective National SALW Commission and National SALW 
Control Strategy; 3) activities to address armed violence as a social and development issue; 4) the implementation 
of an effective Code of Conduct to ensure police compliance with international best practices; 5) improvement of 
police capability to tackle the criminal use of weapons; 6) the development of democratic oversight mechanisms 
to support SALW Control measures; 7) the development of safe and secure ammunition storage and management 
systems; and 8) the disposal of thousands of tonnes of surplus or unsafe ammunition. 
Of particular concern is the safety, security and control of the ammunition stockpiles within Cambodia.  EU-ASAC 
was not mandated to engage on wider ammunition issues, although they have identified and quantified the 
threat.  There are estimated to be over 100,000 tonnes of ammunition present in Cambodia, the vast majority 
of which is stored in unsafe and insecure conditions.  It presents a real security threat that could negate all the 
good work done implementing the control of the weapons, which can easily be operationally replaced by self-
contained rocket launchers, detonators and explosives, thereby increasing the threshold of violence during any 
  1) Identification of problems and opportunities; 2) Programme and component design; 3) Programme and component implementation; and 
4) Evaluation of results and programme redesign.
  UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, (General Assembly Resolution 34/169 of 17 December 1979) and UN Basic 
Principles for the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, (Adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the 
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, 27 August to 07 September 1990).
Cambodia
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Map: EU-ASAC Activities in Cambodia
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future periods of political instability, terrorist or criminal activities in the sub-region.  The ammunition stockpiles 
also pose a significant humanitarian threat to the safety of local communities; in 2005 there was an explosion 
at an ammunition depot caused by stockpile instability resulting in six fatalities and 20 injured.  It is inevitable 
that there will be many more unless this problem is addressed as a matter of priority.
Recommendations
The establishment of EU-ASAC as a Joint Action under the daily operational management of a Special Advisor has 
many advantages in terms of the ability of a programme to respond to changing security, political and economic 
dynamics on the ground.  This flexibility is important for SALW Control interventions because of their need to 
engage in the development, security and humanitarian sectors.  The EU could consider this approach for future 
SALW Control programmes in support of national governments, where appropriate.
Balanced against the above recommendation is the need for longer funding cycles. The EU should consider 
funding cycles of two years or more for future SALW Control programmes. 
Future SALW Control programmes of the EU should not constrain themselves to just specific functional areas of 
SALW Control such as weapons collection or weapons destruction.  They should be provided with the mandate 
and capability to engage in all areas of SALW Control, as holistic and integrated strategies and responses are 
more efficient, effective and have longer-term impact.
  31 March 2005 - Andong Chen.
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Evaluation of EU-ASAC Assistance to the Kingdom of Cambodia
	 Introduction
SEESAC was requested by the Head of the Conventional Disarmament and Human Security Sector (ER/A/4) of 
the Directorate General External Relations (DG RELEX) to conduct the final evaluation of the EU-ASAC programme 
in Cambodia.
There have been previous assessments of the EU-ASAC programme, but their remits were limited to specific 
components and no consistent objective evidence-based evaluation methodology was used or developed.  Within 
the SALW community such objective programme evaluation based on results based management principles, 
rather than subjective assessments, is still a relatively new concept; therefore this evaluation also serves a dual 
purpose of introducing a pilot evaluation methodology for consideration for future SALW Control programmes. 
Evaluation is also complicated by the fact that at the inception of the EU-ASAC programme there was virtually 
no experience of integrated and holistic SALW Control programmes, and therefore the programme was in effect 
developing methodologies and ‘best practices’, which made the development of agreed performance indicators 
for future evaluations problematic.
The SALW Control community now has a range of ‘best 
practices’ and operational support tools available to apply 
to SALW Control programmes, which are based on the 
experience gained in a wide range of initiatives over the 
last five years.  The early experience gained in Cambodia, 
(and Albania 1998/2002), has been invaluable in terms 
of developing programme methodology and technical 
support. It would therefore be unfair to evaluate the EU-
ASAC Cambodia programme strictly in line with current 
‘best practices’ and methodology as; 1) they were not 
available at the inception of the programme; and 2) EU-
ASAC has contributed so much to their development.
The evaluation of this programme was also complicated 
by the project management methodology initiated by 
the European Commission.  As a Joint Action under the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), an EU Special Advisor who also acted as the project manager, under a 
direct contract with the European Commission, implemented the EU-ASAC programme. This is a different process 
to programmes carried out under the EC development budget. Decisions to extend the project from November 
2000 onwards were made on the basis of the project manager’s Annual Reports, which were circulated to 
member states’.  The Terms of Reference (TOR) for the project manager, contained within the relevant European 
Council Decisions, formed the basis for the mandate for that funding year.  Although Outputs were forwarded 
to the EU on an annual basis, no formal project Inputs, desirable Outcomes and Impacts were developed, 
although they could be extrapolated and implied from the project manager’s TOR.  Notwithstanding this much 
was achieved, and this evaluation has ‘extracted’ the relevant Inputs, desirable Outcomes and Impacts from the 
available documentation, structured interviews and a limited confirmatory ‘SALW Perceptions Survey’.  
In contrast the project components supported by bi-lateral donors (primarily the Netherlands and GTZ Germany) 
were developed using the Logical Framework Analysis (LFA) concept, with clear ‘Objectives’ and ‘Indicators’.
  SEESAC was selected as; 1) it is a Regional SALW Initiative; 2) it has developed a range of operational support tools; 3) it is mainly EU 
funded; 4) it is one of the few operational institutions with the range of technical skills necessary for the evaluation of the wide ranging and 
differing components of the EU-ASAC project; and 5) it is independent from the EU-ASAC project.
  See Bibliography.
  Defined as: ‘a process that attempts to determine as systematically and objectively as possible the merit or value of an intervention’.
  E Mail communication from David de Beer, Special Advisor and EU-ASAC Project Manager, 160515B March 2006.
  These are the basic ‘building blocks’ of a Results Based Management (RBM) approach.
Box 4: The Language of Results
Inputs: The financial, human and material resources used by the 
programme.
Outputs: The goods (e.g. weapon storage racks) and services (e.g. 
weapons destroyed), which are directly produced by a project or 
programme.
(Intermediate) Outcomes: The short- and medium-term effects 
arising from people making use of the outputs delivered by a project or 
programme, (e.g. increased weapons security leading to lower weapons 
proliferation).
(Final) Outcomes (Impact): The long-term and sustained effects 
(positive and negative) arising from a project or programme, (e.g. 
improved perceptions of human security resulting in increased economic 
investment and less national capital spent on internal security).
Source:  DAC/OECD (2002)
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The use of this evaluation approach should be able to demonstrate to donors and stakeholders the Outputs the 
programme has achieved over its seven-year life span, and also provide guidance on Outcomes achieved, and 
hence the impact of the programme on illicit possession and proliferation of weapons within Cambodia.  Whilst 
quantitative data is readily available on components such as SALW (Weapons) Collection and Destruction, data 
in terms of the ‘impact’ of the programme is more difficult to identify.  It is relatively simple to determine whether 
the ‘job has been done right’ in terms of efficiency and financial probity, it is much more difficult to establish 
whether ‘the right job has been done’ in terms of effectiveness and impact.  In order to determine whether the 
‘right job has been done’, the evaluation examined:
n Effectiveness.  Were the planned Outputs (and Outcomes) achieved in accordance with international ‘best 
practices’?
n Efficiency.  Did the inputs of the programme result in productive or cost-effective outputs?
n Relevance.  Were the implied objectives set for the programme consistent with government and donor 
policies, and the requirements of the beneficiary communities?
n Sustainability.  Were the capacity and capability of the Cambodian government and CSO partners adequately 
developed to ensure that ‘self sufficiency’ was achieved for the future?
n Impact.0  What were the longer-term effects of the programme judged against implied Outcomes?
This evaluation does not attempt to cover the ‘history’ of the programme or the activities in detail, as these; 
1) have already been well covered in the previous subjective assessments and the project manager’s annual 
reports; and 2) would result in an extremely large document that would replicate existing information.  The 
evaluation will, however, summarise the main components of, and developments during, the programme.
6  Defined as: ‘the extent to which an outcome is achieved through interventions’ or ‘the extent to which a programme achieves its planned 
results (goals, purposes and outputs) and contributes to outcomes’.
7  Defined as: ‘the optimal transformation of inputs into outputs’.
8  Defined as: ‘the degree to which the objectives of the programme remain valid and pertinent as originally planned, or as subsequently 
modified owing to changing circumstances within the immediate context and external environment of the programme’.
9  Defined as: ‘the durability of positive programme results after termination of the programme’.  Sustainability reflects whether the positive 
change in the situation relevant to the programme will endure.
10  Defined as: the overall and long-term effect of an intervention’.  (This is in contrast to the Outcomes, which reflect more immediate 
results).
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	 Evolution	and	development	of	the	EU-ASAC	programme
Following Japanese occupation during the Second World War, Cambodia gained full independence from France 
in 1953, but transition was not smooth. In April 1975, after a five-year struggle, communist Khmer Rouge forces 
captured Phnom Penh, leading to at least 1.5 million Cambodians dying from execution, forced hardships, or 
starvation during the Pol Pot regime. A December 1978 Vietnamese invasion drove the Khmer Rouge into the 
countryside, began a ten-year Vietnamese occupation, and led to almost 13 years of civil war. Although the 
1991 Paris Peace Accords mandated democratic elections and a ceasefire, this was not fully respected by the 
Khmer Rouge.  The 1993 UN sponsored elections helped restore some semblance of normalcy under a coalition 
government, but this ended in 1997 after more factional fighting.  A second round of national elections in 1998 
led to the formation of another coalition government and renewed political stability. 
So in 1998, after nearly thirty years of war, genocide, internal conflict and civil disorder, the Royal Government of 
Cambodia made its first serious attempt to tackle the problems caused by SALW in the country. The government 
recognised that the continued availability and proliferation of large quantities of illegal weapons, combined with 
inadequate national stockpile security, was a major threat to the improving peace and stability in the country. 
The impact of these weapons on Cambodian society, communities and institutions included:
n Fuelling crime and armed violence;
n	 Providing armed groups with the capability for extreme violence;
n	 Increasing the risks of future destabilisation;
n	 Contributing to human rights violations;
n	 Increasing the risks of political violence;
n	 Hindering the implementation of the ‘Rule of Law’;
n	 Contributing to a culture of impunity within the security architecture; 
n	 Ineffective control of government stocks of SALW; and
n	 Contributing to inertia in social and economic development.
Addressing the proliferation and possession of SALW in Cambodia was therefore clearly a complex task. The Royal 
Government of Cambodia lacked the financial resources, technical experience, national capacity, infrastructure 
and operational procedures necessary for effective stockpile management and security.  The concepts of 
community based policing and a ‘Code of Conduct’ for law enforcement officials were distant aspirations, and 
indeed even ‘operational standards’ within the army and police were variable. 
The combination of poverty, crime and unemployment, coupled with a degree of political instability and a general 
public perception of insecurity, meant that voluntary weapons collection initiatives were always going to be 
challenging. Individuals and communities had ultimately to be convinced that the voluntary surrender of illicit 
weapons was in their own interest; only appropriate incentives could influence this decision making process.
Despite their scarcity of resources, low national capacity and basic methodologies, the Royal Government of 
Cambodia commenced weapons registration under Sub-Decree No.68 in 1998, and then weapons collection 
in 1999 following the enactment of Government Sub-Decrees No. 27 and 28 (revoking weapon licences) and 
No. 38 (management of weapons).  These legal instruments initially resulting in legal weapons registration, and 
then made the private possession of weapons illegal. They were implemented using a mixture of persuasive and 
coercive activities to collect illegal weapons from individuals and communities.  Initial success in urban areas 
was good, but the results in rural areas were very variable, and it was apparent that more imaginative approaches 
would be needed.  However, this demonstration of political will by the Royal Government of Cambodia, backed up 
by action on the ground, persuaded the international community of the governments’ commitment to maintaining 
control of the improving security situation.
On 17 December 1998 the European Council had adopted Joint Action 1999/34/CFSP on the European Union’s 
contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons.  Article 
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4(a) of the Joint Action provided for the provision of assistance as appropriate to countries requesting support 
for controlling or eliminating surplus small arms and their ammunition on their territory, in particular where this 
may help to prevent armed conflict or in post-conflict situations.  Cambodia could obviously be considered for 
assistance under this parameter.
The Royal Government of Cambodia therefore appealed to the European Union for assistance to support SALW 
Control activities. After a fact-finding mission to Cambodia, the Council of Ministers of the European Commission 
decided to support the Royal Government of Cambodia in its effort to combat the potentially destabilising 
accumulation and spread of SALW throughout the country and to contribute to promoting the control, collection 
and destruction of weapons in the country. The Council of Ministers further assessed that this excessive 
and uncontrolled accumulation of SALW posed a threat to peace and security and reduced the prospects for 
sustainable development. Therefore EU support to Cambodia clearly fell within the rationale and remit of the 
European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and the EU-ASAC programme was one of the first Joint 
Action initiatives established under the institutional framework of CFSP.
The EU-ASAC programme in Cambodia opened its office in Phnom Penh in April 2000, and the programme 
initially consisted of five specific components:
n	 Assistance to the Royal Government of Cambodia in the development of appropriate legislative and regulatory 
instruments to control the ownership, possession, use, sale and transfer of weapons and ammunition;
n	 Assistance to the Royal Government of Cambodia and the police and security forces in developing procedures 
for the voluntary surrender and collection of weapons; 
n	 Assistance to the Royal Government of Cambodia and the police and security forces in developing procedures 
for identifying and destroying surrendered and surplus weapons, particularly in connection with planned 
demobilisation and restructuring of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF); 
n	 Assistance to the Royal Government of Cambodia and the police and security forces to develop guidelines for 
improved record-keeping and enhancing stockpile management and security for weapons held by them; 
and
n Support to civil society programmes to raise public awareness on problems related to small arms and 
light weapons and to further develop civil society cooperation with the weapons collection and destruction 
process, in particular by supporting activities of the NGOs.
The rationale of the EU-ASAC programme was basically to closely support the operational activities of the Royal 
Government of Cambodia, although it was apparent that they would also have to provide policy and technical 
advice across all aspects of SALW Control. It was agreed that the government and EU-ASAC would have separate 
but complementary roles, which would be coordinated, and that the focus of the programme would be adjusted in 
response to any changing security, economic or operational dynamics on the ground.  The Cambodian authorities 
were primarily responsible for SALW (Weapons) Collection, which was supported by EU-ASAC SALW Awareness 
and Weapons for Development (WfD) schemes.  Two large-scale WfD initiatives were supported in the initial 
phase of the EU-ASAC programme, which were then followed by community micro-WfD incentives.
One of the main activities of the programme has been the provision of financial and technical support for the 
destruction of surplus military weapons, as well as collected and confiscated weapons.  This has acted as a 
Confidence and Security Building Measure (CSBM) for the weapons collection components, whilst simultaneously 
supporting the counter-proliferation strategy, which also included EU-ASAC support for safe and secure weapons 
storage and stockpile management.  The introduction of systematic security procedures and appropriate 
infrastructure should reduce the dangers of future leakages from government stockpiles. 
In 2003 a ‘Weapons Cache’ component was added to the EU-ASAC programme to identify and secure former 
warring faction concealed stockpiles of weapons and ammunition in the remote forested areas of the country 
where large numbers of weapons were thought to remain. The Khmer Rouge were experts at moving quickly 
and lightly through near-impenetrable areas and often buried significant quantities of weapons in specific areas 
to facilitate the swifter movement of guerrilla troops. Forces from other factions also buried weapons in order 
  Which now form five of the eight generally accepted functional areas of integrated and holistic SALW Control interventions.
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to prevent them falling into enemy hands or as a future insurance policy should peace not hold. Areas such as 
the Cardomom Mountains in the south west of Cambodia, the Damreks in the north and the huge forest areas 
surrounding previous Khmer Rouge strongholds or bases were where weapons were considered to be hidden. 
At the request of the Deputy Prime Minister, EU-ASAC was requested to provide technical support to the search 
and destruction operations. This particular activity meant a harsh operating environment due to terrain and 
distances, and needed EU-ASAC support due to the risk of protective improvised explosive devices and the need 
for ‘on the spot’ destruction of weapons and ammunition.
The relevant European Council Resolutions, funding summary, project components and areas of engagement 
are summarised in this matrix:
DATES EC	RESOLUTION BUDGET
VALUE (€)
PROJECT	COMPONENTS PROVINCES	/	DISTRICTS
2000 1999/730/CFSP 500,000
	Legislation development.
	Stockpile management and 
security for SALW (Weapons). 
(Military)
	SALW Awareness and CSO 
development.
	Technical advice.
	Feasibility Study (Military 
SALW Safe Storage)
	Feasibility Study WfD: 
Kratie, Pursat, Kampong 
Thom
2001 2000/724/CFSP 1,300,000
	Stockpile management and 
security for military SALW 
(Weapons). 
	SALW (Weapons) Collection.
	SALW (Weapons) Destruction.
	SALW Awareness and CSO 
development.
	Technical advice.
	Kratie (WfD)
	Pursat  (WfD)
	Kampong Cham (MR 2)
2002 2001/796/CFSP 1,768,200 	Stockpile management and 
security for SALW (Weapons). 
(Police and Military)
	SALW Awareness and CSO 
development.
	SALW (Weapons) Destruction
	Technical advice.
	Battamburg (MR 5)
	Feasibility Study (Police 
Weapons Safe Storage)
2003 2002/904/CFSP 1,568,000
	Kandal (Police)
	Kampong Speu (Police)
	Phnom Penh (Police)
2004 2003/806/CFSP 1,436,953 	Stung Treng (MR 1)
2005 2004/792/CFSP 1,375,565
	Legislation development.
	Stockpile management and 
security for SALW (Weapons).
	SALW (Weapons) Destruction
	Technical advice.
	Phnom Penh (SMR)
	Royal Gendarmerie
2006 2005/784/CFSP 600,000
	Stockpile management and 
security for SALW (Weapons).
	SALW (Weapons) Destruction
	Technical Advice.
	Royal Cambodian Air Force
	Royal Cambodian Navy
TOTAL BUDGET € 8,548,718
Table 1:  Summary of EU-ASAC programme components
  Although the European Council Resolutions were for the time frame November - November, the implementation was conducted over the 
January - December calendar year in order to simplify project administration and reporting.  
 Military Region.
 Special Military Region.
 Until 30 June 2006.
 Although the actual expenditure (2000 - 2005) was only 77% of budget.
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The programme also attracted bi-lateral support from donors, which was administered through the EU-ASAC 
programme, (see paragraph 5.3.4).  This aspect of their work does not form part of this evaluation, as the donors 
have conducted their own assessments of the EU-ASAC impact on their behalf.  One of these initial donors was 
the Government of Japan, who then decided to establish their own programme, the Japanese Assistance Team 
for Small Arms Management in Cambodia (JSAC), in 2003.  This particular intervention was not particularly 
helpful in terms of a coordinated approach by the international community to supporting SALW control within 
Cambodia, and is discussed later (see paragraph 4.4.2).
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	 Evaluation	methodology
3.1 Analysis - Institutional and Capacity Development (I&CD) issues
Many things are required for effective organisational 
performance.  First, the organisation must have the 
requisite capacity, based around individual skills 
and knowledge, sound management systems, a 
proper organisational structure, and adequate 
resources.  Second, an organisation’s performance 
may be enhanced or constrained by the actions of 
other organisations with which it must work. Finally, 
institutions create an incentive structure for an 
organisation, which will determine whether it and 
its staff are motivated to pursue the organisation’s 
mandate. These different factors underlying an 
organisations performance (capacities; coordination; 
and incentives) are illustrated in the Venn diagram.
Organisational performance issues can also be 
grouped into four levels to create the basic I&CD 
framework, depicted below:
LEVEL TYPICAL	PERFORMANCE	ISSUES POSSIBLE	ACTIONS
Individual
•	 Skills.
•	 Experience.
•	 Employee demographics, (gender, 
ethnic etc).
•	 Staff training.
•	 Recruitment policies and procedures.
Organisational
•	 General management approaches.
•	 Functional management policies, 
(finance, personnel, logistics etc).
•	 Information systems.
•	 Resources.
•	 Management training.
•	 Revise policies and procedures.
•	 System development.
•	 Fundraising drives.
Task networks
•	 Coordination with other SALW 
Control organisations.
•	 Coordination with other 
government bodies.
•	 Coordination with other 
development agencies.
•	 Establish SALW Control working groups.
•	 Revise government liaison processes.
•	 Regional or community development working 
groups.
Institutional environment/
Incentive structure
•	 Public governance problems.
•	 Multiple objectives within the 
international community or donors.
•	 Donor policies.
•	 Revise national SALW Control legislation and 
procedures.
•	 Establish consultative group, (or donor 
coordination mechanism).
•	 Revise format for project proposals and 
progress reporting to agree with donor 
requirements.
Table 2:  Basic institutional and capacity development framework 
Performance development entails identifying and resolving constraints arising in any or all of these levels.  This 
I&CD framework is used to ensure that problems and opportunities are examined in a systematic fashion.  This 
methodology has been used as a benchmark throughout this assessment report, but the report is not structured 
  Often the term ‘institution’ is used in reference to organisations - particularly well-known organisations such as the ICRC.  Increasingly 
however, ‘institution’ is used to refer to laws and social norms that establish incentives to act along certain lines or to avoid certain behaviours. 
In this latter case, as it is used in this report, ‘institutions’ are ‘rules of the game’ while organisations and individuals are the ‘players’.
Organisational
performance
Capacity,
individuals;
organisation
Coordination
with other
entities
Incentives/
Motivation
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in the above format; rather it has been designed to cover separate distinct task areas, based on Outputs and 
Outcomes, as the evaluation team considered that this was the best approach to identify performance and 
overall impact.
3.2 Identification of programme components
The separate functional area components of the programme were identified as shown in the following matrix:
LOCATION/PROVINCE/
MILITARY	REGION
SALW	
LEGISLATION	
DEVELOPMENT
SALW	
COLLECTION
SALW	
DESTRUCTION
SALW	
STOCKPILE	
MANAGEMENT	
AND	SECURITY
SALW	
AWARENESS	
AND	CSO	
DEVELOPMENT
COMMUNITY	
POLICE	
TRAINING	AND	
DEVELOPMENT
National Government 2000 - 2006
Banteay Meanchey 2001 / 2002
Battambang 2002 - 2003 2001 / 2002 2002 - 2003
Kampong Cham 2002 - 2003 2001 / 2004 2002 - 2003 2003
Kampong Chnnang 2001 / 2005 2003
Kampong Som 2002 - 2003 2005 2002 - 2003
Kampong Speu 2002 - 2003 2002 / 2005 2003 (Police) 2002 - 2003 2003
Kampong Thom 2001 – 2004 2003
Kandal 2006 2003 (Police)
Koh Kong 2004
Kompot 2002 - 2003 2003 / 2005 2002 - 2003 2003
Kratie 2001 - 2002 2001 – 2006 2002
Krong Kep 2003
Krong Pailin 2003
Otdar Meanchey 2005
Pailin 2002 - 2003 2001 2002 - 2003
Phnom Penh (SMR) 2005 – 2006 
Phnom Penh (Police) 2003
Preah Vihear 2003 2003 / 2006 2003 2003
Pursat 2001 - 2003 2001 – 2005 2003 2002 - 2003
Rattanakiri 2002
Siem Reap 2002 – 2006
Stung Treng 2003 / 2004
Svay Rieng 2004
Takeo 2002 - 2003 2001 2002 - 2003
MR 1 Stung Treng + 2004 - 2006
MR 2 Kampong Cham 2001 - 2006
MR 3 Kampong 
Speu + 2005 - 2006
MR 4 Siem Reap + 2003 - 2006
MR 5 Battambang + 2002 - 2006
Royal Gendarmerie 2005 - 2006
Royal Air Force 2006
Royal Navy 2006
WGWR 2001 - 2006
Table 3:  EU-ASAC programme components, dates and locations
The Inputs, Outputs and desirable Outcomes for each functional area component of the programme were 
identified qualitatively and quantitatively, and then rated.
  Based on the internationally accepted functional areas of SALW Control; 1) Legislative and regulatory issues; 2) Cross border controls; 3) 
SALW Survey; 4) SALW Collection; 5) SALW Destruction; 6) Stockpile management; 7) SALW Awareness; and 8) Information management.
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.	 Rating	system
The following rating system was used, where possible, for the evaluation of the components of this programme:
KEY	ELEMENTS YES PARTIAL NO
Outputs Achieved
Only if 66% or more of the 
quantifiable target was 
achieved.
Not achieved.
Table 4:  Output rating system
KEY	ELEMENTS POSITIVE	CHANGE NEUTRAL	CHANGE NEGATIVE	CHANGE
Outcomes
Positive move from initial 
baseline to the target as 
measured by outcome 
indicators.
No perceptible change 
between baseline and target 
as measured by outcome 
indicators.
Reversal to a level below the 
baseline as measured by the 
outcome indicators.
Table 5:  Outcome rating system
3.4 Qualitative and quantitative evaluation (indicators)
Quantitative and qualitative indicators were discussed with the programme management team and their national 
counterparts, and then data collection was conducted to identify evidence to support programme outputs and 
outcomes.  
The evaluation team also looked specifically at the impact EU-ASAC had on the:
n Deterrence of individuals, groups and organizations from illegally possessing SALW;
n Denial of access to SALW by inappropriate holders or users;
n Disruption of criminal operations, and their movement and storage of SALW; and
n Destruction of surrendered, captured or surplus SALW.
The following matrices was developed and agreed, and then applied to individual programme components, as 
appropriate:
  As used in the UNDP Monitoring and Evaluation system.
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OUTCOMES OUTCOME	INDICATORS
A reduction in armed violence.
	Variance in armed violence and weapon related crime statistics.
	Reduction in the open visibility of weapons in the community.
	Reduction in the number of weapons available to criminals.
Reduction in, or disruption to, the 
illicit trade and transfer of SALW.
	Variance in weapons seizures by the security services.
	Effective control of legal weapons transfers and trade.
	Reduction in the number of weapons losses within the security sector in the 
targeted areas.
	Positive variance in ‘black market’ weapon prices.
Improved perceptions of human 
security in the EU-ASAC areas of 
operation.
	Positive improvement in individual and community perceptions of human 
security.
An effective and functioning National 
SALW Commission.
	Has a National SALW Commission been established?
	Was it developed as part of an ALL stakeholder consultative process?
	Regular meetings and effective parliamentary oversight.
Development and implementation of 
an effective National SALW Control 
Strategy.
	Developed by the National SALW Commission.
	Disseminated to all relevant stakeholders.
	Strategy is reviewed and amended on a regular basis to respond to 
changing dynamics.
Implementation of appropriate and 
effective weapons legislation. 	Effective control of weapons transfers. 
Building community awareness of 
the SALW problem.
	Demonstrated understanding by individuals and communities of the impact 
of SALW on communities.
Improved social and economic 
development opportunities.
	Trends in local investment.
	Trends in foreign direct investment (FDI).
	Trends in economic/humanitarian aid requirements.
	Impact of police family support income generation mini-projects.
Contribute towards the concept of 
effective community based policing 
(CBP).
	The development of an effective CBP concept is a desirable outcome within 
Cambodia, but was outside the mandate of the EU-ASAC, and work was 
conducted in support of other initiatives as a result of identified synergy. 
This is a massive task, that EU-ASAC was only financially positioned to make 
a contribution towards the development of concepts, principles and pilot 
projects.
Table 7:  Outcome indicators
3.5 Confirmatory SALW Perception Survey (SAPS)
The evaluation contains participatory components, where all stakeholders were consulted, (within the limitations 
of time, space and the small size of the evaluation team).  Whilst traditional Key Informant Interviews (KII) 
were held with government stakeholders, a confirmatory SALW Perceptions Survey was also developed from the 
principles laid down in the SALW Survey Protocols,0 and then conducted at the individual and village level. This 
0  See www.seesac.org.  SALW Survey Protocols.
  KII with villagers were conducted to reveal their perceptions of security, trust in the police and awareness of SALW in the Provinces of 
Kampong Cham, Preah Vihear and Pursat, which were targeted by EUASAC with SALW awareness and police training. The evaluation team 
visited five Districts (two in Kampong Cham and Pursat and one in Preah Vihear). These Districts were selected by EUASAC partner NGOs in 
Kampong Cham and Preah Vihear and by the Provincial Rural Development Committee in Pursat, based on their willingness to talk with the 
evaluation team.
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involved the conduct of in-depth Key Informant Interviews (KII) using ‘snowball sampling’ in the communities 
where the EU-ASAC programme had been active.  This component of the evaluation was considered crucial for 
identifying Outcomes and potential Impact of the EU-ASAC programme.
The KII were designed to provide qualitative assessments of the following:
	 The impact of SALW Awareness activities on individuals’ understanding of the manifest ways in which 
SALW affect a community; 
	 The impact of the reduction of SALW in the community, on individual and community perceptions of 
security; and
	 The impact of improving the police’s capacity to provide community-level security.
Stakeholders at district-, commune- and village-level were consulted using KIIs, namely Local Authority Governors, 
Police Inspectors and Chiefs, Village Chiefs and Civil Society Organisations. Village members were selected non-
randomly according to profession, wealth, status, gender and geographic location so as to reflect a diversity of 
experiences resulting from the WfD and police capacity development components.
  A non-random sampling method whereby individuals are selected according to recommendations by interviewees; this method is useful 
when data is not readily available on the individual profiles of village members. In this way the evaluation team was able to speak with a 
cross-section of village members.
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	 Findings
.	 Outputs
The detailed output indicator results of the programme are at Annexes A to F in tabular format.  The major 
outputs of the EU-ASAC programme can be summarised as: 
GENERIC	OUTPUT	AREA INDICATOR	RESULT RATING
Legislative and Regulatory Issues
	Development of effective appropriate arms control, export and 
transfers legislation. ACHIEVED
	Adoption of arms control legislation with supporting 
administrative instruments. ACHIEVED
	Formation and operation of National SALW Commission. PARTIAL
	Development and implementation of a National SALW Control 
Strategy. NOT ACHIEVED
SALW Collection
	12,775 weapons collected under auspices of EU-ASAC 
programme. ACHIEVED
	43,216 rounds of ammunition collected under auspices of EU-
ASAC project. ACHIEVED
	Nine illegal weapons caches identified and cleared, leading 
to seizure of an additional 624 weapons and 1,075 rounds of 
ammunition.
ACHIEVED
	Development projects led to the construction/repair of 8 x 
Schools, 275 Water Wells, 1 Health Post and 4 Bridges. ACHIEVED
	No casualties during collection operations. ACHIEVED
SALW Destruction
	142,871 weapons destroyed. ACHIEVED
	Cost per weapon destroyed - € 2.65 ACHIEVED
	No casualties during destruction operations. ACHIEVED
Stockpile Management and Security
	45 Weapon Storage Depots constructed. ACHIEVED
	8 Weapon Storage Depots renovated. ACHIEVED
	Total storage capacity developed for 158,760 weapons, (including 
short term weapon storage racks at a wide range of locations). ACHIEVED
	Appropriate Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) developed and 
implemented.  Training also provided. ACHIEVED
SALW Awareness and CSO Development
	Level of participation of CSO in WfD programme components. 
	Confirmatory SALW Perceptions Survey. 
	Participation of CSO in WfD activities.
	Media monitoring of coverage of SALW activities.
PARTIAL
Police Capacity Development
	Development and government approval of a formal, published 
‘Code of Conduct’ was not achieved for political reasons outside 
EU-ASAC influence.
NOT ACHIEVED
	Procurement of equipment (73 motorcycles, 331 bicycles and 
383 radios) to support police operational capacity to provide local 
security. (Total value = € 170,934).
ACHIEVED
	Design of Community Based Policing (CBP) training package.  
Delivered to approximately 925 police officers in 2002/2003. ACHIEVED
Table 8:  Summary of output indicator results 
  Indicators that are also ‘Outcome’ as well as ‘Output’ are covered in Section 4.2 - Outcomes.
  Operational costs of destruction.  This is at the lower end of the price range based on experience globally.
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.	 Outcomes		
It is not possible to definitively state that the positive impacts in reducing armed violence in Cambodia were 
achieved solely as the direct result of the government and EU-ASAC arms control programmes, as so many other 
factors, other than weapons availability and lack of controls, influence armed violence. Yet 1998 marks the 
beginning of the Cambodian government’s efforts to remove firearms from civilian control, and 1999 saw the 
start of the EU-ASAC interventions.  Since this time however, there has been a steady decline in armed violence 
in Cambodia.  It is reasonable, however, to draw the conclusion that the commitment of the Royal Government 
of Cambodia towards reducing the availability and proliferation of weapons, supported by EU-ASAC, has had a 
considerable positive impact on armed violence within the country.
..	 Reduction	in	armed	violence
Data on armed violence is difficult to develop, as there are no consolidated records available from a single source. 
Research by the WGWR and the Small Arms Survey indicates that firearm homicide has declined dramatically 
from 4.0 - 5.4 per 100,000 in 1998 to 1.1 - 1.7 in 2003.  This is a reduction of 70% (using mid-point levels) over 
a five-year period for which data is available.  Qualitative evidence held in the WGWR database also suggests that 
this low rate of firearms homicide has been sustained over the last two years (2004 - 2005), and this is supported 
by hospital admission data.  This shows that at the high point in 1993, 65% of victims of assault were as a result 
of gun shot wounds, whilst in 2004 this had fallen to as low as 2.6%. This data is supported by the analysis 
conducted by the Small Arms Survey of violent incidents reported in the Phnom Penh Post, which showed that 
the use of firearms in all violent incidents reduced from 80% (1994) to 30% (2004). Positive Change.
The overall homicide rate has also dropped from 6.9 - 9.0 per 100,000 in 1998 to 3.1 - 4.0 in 2003. This is a 
reduction of 55% (using mid-point levels) over the same period. This is a significant indicator of the impact of the 
SALW control activities within Cambodia, as in 1998 60% of homicides were committed using weapons, and by 
2003 this ratio had dropped to 40%.  The proportional reduction of armed violence compared to overall crime 
and violence levels could be explained by the reduction in the availability of weapons, thus reducing the lethality 
of violence in Cambodia. Positive Change.
In terms of injuries sustained by the use of weapons, limited data suggests that the hospital admissions rate 
for weapon victims has fallen from 4.0% of total admissions in 1998 to 0.1% by 2004.  (Although this particular 
indicator must be treated with caution due to limited data, and the fact that many casualties will not necessarily 
be treated in hospitals).  Notwithstanding this caution it is still a Positive Change. 
In terms of reported offences, those for armed robbery have fallen from 32% in 1996 to 25% in 2004.  This is a 
measurable reduction, but also could indicate that armed robbery is now at such a level that future SALW Control 
is unlikely to have a major impact as a ‘mean level’ has been reached.  Further reductions will only come about 
as a result of routine police crime prevention and detection activities. Positive Change.
..	 Reduction	in,	or	disruption	to,	the	illicit	trade	and	transfer	of	SALW
Recent operational research has suggested that the number of weapons available within Cambodia, at the time 
of the Paris Agreements in 1991, was in the region of 319,500 - 462,500.  These figures were determined 
using social science research methodology for weapons estimates developed over the last five years, and 
although uncertainty remains, the figures are certainly in the right order of magnitude to a high confidence level. 
  The detailed firearms homicide statistics and weapon estimates have been extracted from a forthcoming publication by Christina Wille, 
Finding the evidence: the links between weapon collection programmes, gun use, and homicide rates in Cambodia. Small Arms Survey, 
Geneva, 24 April 2006 (Draft).
  Source for data in this section based on the WGWR database; a forthcoming publication by Wille, Christina. Finding the evidence: the links 
between weapon collection programmes, gun use, and homicide rates in Cambodia. Small Arms Survey, Geneva, 24 April 2006 (Draft); and 
Small Arms Survey.  Stabilizing Cambodia - Small Arms Control and Security Sector Reform. Small Arms Survey 2006, Chapter 5. Geneva, 
Switzerland. Released 26 June 2006.
  http://www.c-r.org/accord/cam/accord5/acc_cont.shtml
  Data rounded to nearest 250 weapons.
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The evaluation team developed the following matrix based on the confirmed weapons statistics and worked 
backwards to attempt to confirm the recent estimates:
WEAPONS	DATA LOWER	RANGE MEAN
HIGHER	
RANGE SOURCE	/	REMARKS
Weapons Destroyed (1999 - 2006) 192,000 EU-ASAC Data
Weapons in Government Storage (2006) 140,250
EU-ASAC estimates that the 
government is storing to 85% 
capacity.  It is known that a 
storage capacity for 164,892 
weapons has been developed by 
EU-ASAC and JSAC.
Sub-Total 332,250
Small Arms Survey Estimates on Weapon 
Levels in 1991 319,500 325,500 462,500
Revised Estimate (1991 Levels) based 
on EU-ASAC Data and Small Arms Survey 
Upper Estimate
352,250 407,375 462,500
Table 9:  Analysis of weapons estimates and data (1991 - 2006)
This analysis suggest that the lower range estimate of weapons in Cambodian society in 1991 is an underestimate, 
although there is no reason to dispute the upper estimate of 462,500 weapons.  It would also be unrealistic to 
suggest that there are no illegal weapons in Cambodian society today.  The balance between confirmed data 
in 2006, and the upper estimate for 1991 is 130,250 illicit weapons.  Therefore it would not be unrealistic to 
propose that the balance of illicit weapons remaining in Cambodia is in the range of 20,000 - 130,250 weapons, 
(a mean of 75,125 weapons). 0  Positive Change.
Taking appropriate mid-point figures means that approximately 82% of the estimated conflict weapons have 
been taken under control, which is a remarkable achievement by the Royal Government of Cambodia and their 
partners. Positive Change.
The risks of proliferation of weapons have been significantly reduced by the EU-ASAC development of appropriate 
safe and secure weapons storage infrastructure and systems for 158,760 weapons.  The destruction of 142, 871 
weapons under the auspices of EU-ASAC has also been a highly effective counter-proliferation tactic, ensuring 
that these particular weapons are truly beyond use. Positive Change.
The counter-proliferation strategy of the government has been supported by the new arms control legislation, 
which in effect means that only the government is allowed to purchase, possess or sell weapons in Cambodia. 
There is no evidence available to suggest that major criminal or armed faction transfers of weapons now take 
place within Cambodia. Although small scale smuggling for criminal purposes will inevitably continue, this activity 
can only be countered by intelligence-led police operations, which was outside the mandate of the EU-ASAC 
programme.  This area should be addressed in future security sector reform support to the Royal Government of 
Cambodia. Neutral Change.
The ‘black market’ price of weapons is often a useful indicator of the effectiveness of a SALW counter-proliferation 
strategy, although care must be used in how the data is analysed to guard against false deductions.  In the case 
of Cambodia, data is now difficult to obtain, which is at least indicative of the impact that the very restrictive arms 
laws have had.  
  The land area of Cambodia is 176,520 square kilometres. Therefore the spatial distribution of illegal weapons is between 0.11 to 0.74 
weapons per square kilometre.  Alternatively the spatial distribution is 1 illegal weapon in every 1.35 to 8.83 square kilometres, although in 
reality a number will be concentrated in the main population centres.
0  With a population of 13,881,000 (CIA World Factbook 2006), this equates to an illegal weapon distribution by population of between 1 
for every 107 persons, to 1 for every 694 persons. 
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WEAPON	TYPE
APPROXIMATE COST BY YEAR (US$) %	VARIANCE	
(	-	
2006)
LEGAL	COST	
(2006)	 00	 00	
Assault Rifle (AK47) 25 160 110 + 440% 490
Pistol (K54) 120 180 900 + 750% 408
Table 10:  Summary of trends in ‘black market’ weapons prices (1998 - 2006) 
A range of factors will have influenced this variance in the prices, but the significant increase in the costs of an 
illegal pistol suggests a very restricted supply, whilst the decrease in the costs of an illegal assault rifle (between 
2002 and 2006) could be explained by the fact that demand has fallen as a result of restrictive arms legislation. 
Further research would be needed to objectively support this hypothesis. Positive Change.
..	 Improved	perceptions	of	human	security
The security situation in Cambodia had significantly improved by mid-2002, and the Royal Government of 
Cambodia then considered that a large proportion of the illegal weapons had been placed under government 
control.  The activities of EU-ASAC in supporting the government in SALW (Weapons) Collection and Destruction 
undoubtedly made a contribution to this improvement in security. Positive Change.
The remaining security problems at that time were largely due to a low capacity of the security forces to maintain 
law and order, rather than a proliferation of weapons.  Consequently large-scale weapons for development 
projects did not seem to be a realistic proposition in terms of acting purely as an incentive to remove weapons 
from communities, although there would be development and human security perception benefits.  The decision 
was therefore taken to continue with community level micro-WfD projects, whilst improving the capacity of the 
RCAF to maintain effective control of their own stocks of SALW.  
Recent qualitative research conducted by the WGWR during 2005  suggests that perceptions of human security 
have significantly improved since 2002,  (although it must be remembered that the data set collected by WGWR 
is insufficient for statistical validity to a known error margin or confidence level, and should therefore be regarded 
as qualitative rather than quantitative).  Positive Change;
QUESTION	/	RESULT
%	FINDING
REMARKS
MALE FEMALE
Compared to three years ago, is the security 
in your area better or worse? 91.4 82.5 % for Better Security
Do you believe there are fewer guns than 
three years ago? 88.6 71.9 % for Fewer Guns
Does owning a weapon make you more or 
less safe? 88.6 84.2 % for Less Safe
Table 11:  Summary of WGWR conclusions on changed perceptions of human security (2002 - 2005)
The key informant interviews revealed that, with only one exception, a strong sense of personal security both 
within individuals’ respective villages and also outside of the villages now prevails. The following indicators were 
used to assess perceptions of personal security:
  Sinthay N and Ashby K.  Possibilities to Reduce the Number of Weapons and the Practice of Using Weapons to Solve Problems in 
Cambodia. 1998. (Mid-point figures in the range have been quoted in the Table).
  Linter, Bertil. Involvement of organised crime in the illicit trade in SALW in South East and East Asia.  Background Paper, Small Arms 
Survey, Geneva, 2002.
  Source:  David de Beer, EU-ASAC Project Manager, 01 June 2006.
  Saman, Tieng, Dianna Long and Adam Platt.  Small Arms and Security in Cambodia - Changes and Challenges.  WGWR, Phnom Penh, 
Cambodia, December 2005.
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n	 Informants felt confident moving freely in their village, even after dark;
n	 Informants felt confident travelling to remote farmland (a precondition for sustaining livelihoods);
n	 Informants have never seen or heard a gun that does not belong to the security forces over the last three 
years;
n	 Informants did not fear gun-related violence; and
n	 Informants noted that it is ‘not easy’ to acquire a gun, (perceptions of the availability of weapons is an 
important factor in perceptions of personal security).
In all target areas, however, there is a persistent problem with gang and criminal violence. Although gang members 
are usually not armed with weapons, and instead carry alternative weapons such as knives, it was noted by some 
informants, particularly those who own businesses in their village, that it would be an advantage to have a gun 
in the event that they were targeted for robbery.
..	 Effective	and	functioning	National	SALW	Commission
The National Commission for the Reform and Management of Weapons and Explosives in Cambodia (NCWMR) 
was formed on 21 June 2000.  Although the composition of the commission includes the relevant government 
ministries (less the Ministries of Education and Health), there is no civil society representation.  More problematic 
is that the commission meets very infrequently, is ineffective, and has not had any impact on the development 
of an integrated, holistic national SALW Control strategy.  It should be a priority area for the future.  Neutral 
Change.
The fact that the commission is chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister (Minister of Interior), has three other 
Deputy Prime Ministers as members and also includes the Commander in Chief of the RCAF and Director General 
of the Police, means that it is unlikely that it can ever meet to discuss operational issues.  It is too high level to be 
effective, and responsibility should be devolved to a more practical level to improve effectiveness and efficiency 
of the commission.
..	 Development	and	implementation	of	an	effective	National	SALW	Control	Strategy
Although many of the elements of a National SALW Control Strategy are in place due to EU-ASAC engagement, 
there is no formal strategy developed in partnership with all stakeholders, and then integrated across government 
departments.  This must become a priority for the Royal Government of Cambodia if the excellent progress made 
towards effective SALW Control is not to be compromised in the future.  Positive Change.
..	 Implementation	of	appropriate	and	effective	weapons	legislation
The law on ‘the Management of Weapons, Explosives and Ammunition of the Kingdom of Cambodia’ (2005) and 
its subsidiary legislation reflects and follows international ‘best practices’ in terms of the principles for regulatory 
control of SALW. The 2005 legislation places paramount importance on the protection of national safety and 
security interests by introducing very restrictive regime of SALW control. Clear legal responsibilities and the 
organization of arms control within the Kingdom of Cambodia are established within the legislation.  Positive 
Change.
The position in terms of implementation of the law is not so clear, as effective implementation relies on a series 
of sub-decrees (or subsidiary regulations) to support the law and provide the detailed definitions and details 
necessary for enforcement.  Although EU-ASAC developed drafts of these supporting instruments (sub-decrees) 
in November 2005, adoption and implementation has stalled to a degree.  This means that the legislation is in 
effect unenforceable, and cannot be effectively implemented.  The WGWR have initiated a public information 
campaign, supported by EU-ASAC, to explain the new arms law to the public. Positive Change.
  For example the OSCE Best Practice Guides or SEE RMDS/G 03.20 - SALW Control and Transfers Legislation.
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Whilst a Code of Conduct for law enforcement officials was conceptually developed in 2001 with the assistance 
of EU-ASAC, political influences and agendas within the implementing NGO had a negative impact on government 
acceptance.  The ‘Code of Conduct’ eventually proposed by the NGO was conceptually realistic, but was; 1) too 
complicated for realistic daily use; and 2) relied on regulations and proposed legislation rather than ‘behavioural 
issues’; it is therefore unachievable within current political constraints in its present form. It is unfinished 
business that has potential for the future if presented in a different manner. It is a major opportunity for future 
engagement in wider SSR, and should be redesigned and written to comply with the relevant best practices. 
Adoption of such a Code of Conduct would make a major contribution towards reducing the alleged misuse of 
weapons by law enforcement officials, make an important contribution to security sector reform, and in time 
further improve public confidence in the security architecture. Neutral Change.
..	 Building	community	awareness	of	the	SALW	problem
Whilst conducting interviews with the villagers it quickly became clear that the overriding motivation for people 
to hand in their weapons during the SALW collection phases was the fear of punishment for illegal possession. 
Additionally, informants also indicated that many villagers informed the police about other villagers possessing 
weapons, which suggested a desire to rid the village of weapons. The KII revealed the following insights.  Positive 
Change:
THEMATIC	AREA INSIGHTS
Illegality of civilian weapon possession:
	Knowledge in the community that civilians are not legally entitled to carry guns, 
and that there is a strict penalty for such possession; and
	A belief that civilians have no justification for owning weapons since the police 
are responsible for their security.
Link between security and development:
	An understanding that weapons in the village breed fear of violence, and where 
people are too afraid to farm their land, this negatively impacts on the village’s 
development.
Risks that weapons in the community pose:
	An understanding that where weapons are kept in the house, family disputes 
may become dangerously violent;
	An understanding amongst female informants that children may come into 
contact with any weapons kept in the house; and
	An understanding that weapons are easily misused and contribute to human 
rights violations.
Table 12:  Community awareness insights from Key Informant Interviews
..	 Improved	social	and	economic	development	opportunities	in	the	EU-ASAC	areas	of	
operation
...	 National	data
Regrettably quantitative data and time was unavailable to enable this indicator to be measured with any accuracy 
or credibility on a sub-regional or locality basis.  The EU-ASAC programme alone will certainly not be directly 
responsible for any positive changes in social and economic development, although the programme will inevitably 
have made a contribution to the improvements in security that act as a major stimulant for economic growth and 
investment.  Positive Change. It is possible though to identify the changes in the Cambodian economy since 
the initiation of the weapons control initiatives, although it must be remembered that 75% of the population still 
remains engaged in subsistence farming:
  UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, (General Assembly Resolution 34/169 of 17 December 1979) and UN Basic 
Principles for the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, (Adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the 
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, 27 August to 07 September 1990).
  See Small Arms Survey.  Stabilizing Cambodia - Small Arms Control and Security Sector Reform. Small Arms Survey 2006, Chapter 5, pp 
130 - 133. Geneva, Switzerland. Released 26 June 2006, for more background details of these allegations. 
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INDICATOR  000 00 00 00 00 00 %	CHANGE
(1999 - 2005)
GDP (PPP)  
(US$ Million)	
3,400.0 3,651.0 3,787.0 4,079.0 4,355.0 4,888.0 5,302.0 + 55.9 %
GDP Growth Rate (%)0 11.4 8.4 5.5 5.2 7.0 7.7 5.1
7.2 % 
(Average Annual 
Growth)
GDP Per Capita (GPP) 
(US$)
273.0 288.0 293.0 310.0 325.0 357.0 380.0 + 39.2 %
Gross Domestic 
Investment Fixed (% 
GDP)
15.9 13.5 17.9 16.2 16.6 17.0 22.8 + 43.4 %
Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) (US$ 
Million)
230.0 149.0 148.0 54.0 84.0 131.0 169.0 - 26.5 %
Table 13:  Economic growth indicators0
...	 Economic	opportunities	to	counter	corruption
EU-ASAC worked in partnership with an international NGO (Helen Keller International) to develop the concept of 
providing limited economic development support to the families of police officers, primarily as what would now be 
considered as a counter-corruption issue, but was regarded at the time as police capacity development. Although 
funded by the UK outside core EU resources, the concept is imaginative and provides major opportunities 
for future development within a wider SSR concept, and hence deserving of conceptual analysis within this 
evaluation.  
The EU-ASAC had determined in 2001 that one of the reasons for ineffective community based policing was 
the poverty levels endemic within police families, thereby leaving the police officer open to very low financial 
incentives for corruption.  A hypothesis was developed that if the families of police officers could be trained and 
supported in low-level income generation that the need for corrupt activities should reduce.
From the hypothesis, and based on previous local community income generation experience, the concept was 
developed in 2003 to provide specific local agricultural development support in the form of Village Model Gardens 
(VMG) and Village Model Poultry Farms (VMPF) to the spouses of police officers.  They were provided with not only 
the capability to develop their own small-scale enterprises, but also the skills and resources necessary to train 
families to develop similar enterprises within their communities.  The anticipated benefits of such an approach 
would be to:
  Gross Domestic Product (Purchasing Power Parity)
  Source: EIC. Cambodia Economic Watch. Oct 05. Economic Institute of Cambodia. Table A 2.1 p95.  
 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCAMBODIA/Resources/CEW3.pdf
0  Ibid.
  Ibid.
  Asian Development Outlook 2003: Statistical Appendix. Statistical Notes and Tables. Table A8 - GDI. http://www.adb.org/Documents/
Books/ADO/2003/statnotes.asp
  The World Factbook. Cambodia, 2005. http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/cb.html
 World Investment Report 2005: Transnational Corporations and the Internationalization of R & D.  Annex. Table B.1. FDI flows, by region 
and economy, 2002 - 2004. p 306.  http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2005annexes_en.pdf
  Ibid.
  Country Analysis Cambodia. Demographic/Social, Political and Economic Environment. FDI 2005.
       http://www.fesspore.org/pdf/Trade%20Union/Year%202005/cambodia.pdf
  Funding for this activity was only Euro 96,000.
  The monthly average police salary of a rural based police officer within Cambodia is still only US$ 20 per month.
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n	Make a contribution to police confidence by projecting the concept that their families had additional roles to 
support the community, based on a consensual approach to law enforcement, rather than just being seen 
as the instruments of state control;
n	Provide food production and income generation opportunities for the whole community, led by police 
spouses;
n	Develop a means to integrate police families as productive members of the community; 
n	Act as support to the development of a concept of community based policing; and primarily
n	Provide additional income to police families to reduce their reliance on very low-level corruption as a 
necessity for family support.
The additional benefits of this type of programme, outside the pure SALW control or SSR perspectives, would be 
to; 1) improve the efficiency of subsistence farming; 2) broaden the diet of rural communities benefiting from 
such a programme; and 3) result in both increased nutrition and income for the participants. 
The evaluation team travelled to one of the targeted communes for police family support. After discussions with 
six police wives, three beneficiaries from the village and the NGO that carried out the training for the programme, 
the following insights and impacts were revealed.  Positive Change: 0
THEMATIC	AREA INSIGHTS
Police and community relations:
	Villagers now come to police wives for advice on family disputes more often 
than they used to;
	Police wives play a mediating role between villagers and policemen when 
the former think the latter have not performed their duties; and
	There is increased interaction between villagers and police wives as a result 
of the VMPF and VMG activities.
Impact on income:
	Whereas prior to the project police wives spent their income on buying 
vegetables in the market, money can now be saved through growing their 
own vegetables;
	Police wives spend about 40 - 50% of their time working on the VMG and 
VMPF, which has not negatively impacted on their other farming activities; 
and
	Time is now spent more productively working on the VMPF and VMG, 
whereas before the project many villagers spent a lot more time with less 
reward, foraging for food in the forests to sustain themselves.
Impact on nutrition
	The training equipped police wives and villagers with better methods for 
growing vegetables, which has meant that crops are considerably better 
than when traditional methods used to be employed.
Table 14:  Social and economic insights from Key Informant Interviews
PROJECT	COMPONENT
FINDINGS
POLICE	WIVES VILLAGERS
Income generation
50% increase
(US$ 1.25 increase per month for 15 
police wives)
Estimated 40% increase for 600 
– 900 households
Improved police-community relations POSITIVE CHANGE POSITIVE CHANGE
Table 15: Impact of police family support project
  Rohah Commune in Rovieng District, Preah Vihear Province
0  The evaluation team spoke with villagers from Kampot village and the police wives were working in the following four villages: Kampon, 
Keng, Sauke Roung and Kam Pot.
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This is considered by the evaluation team to be an initially innovative, then proven concept as an activity to 
support security sector reform.  Regrettably any future process in this concept was constrained by the lack of 
bi-lateral support, and therefore its effectiveness and applicability in wider environments cannot be properly 
analysed.  However, the experience of the evaluation team, based on past experiences and to a degree emotional 
instinct, suggests that this concept, implemented with a degree of imagination, could have a major role to play 
in future SSR and CBP development programmes in appropriate environments.  The limited evidence obtained 
during the SALW Perceptions Survey has indicated that this approach has had an impact in terms of improved 
perceptions of security; but these can only be sustained if the institutional and structural weaknesses within 
the Cambodian law enforcement agencies are addressed. Again further analytical research of this component 
is deemed necessary by the evaluation team, who feel that it was potentially a major missed opportunity by the 
international community in Cambodia.
..	 Summary	of	Outcome	results
GENERIC	OUTCOME	AREA RATING
A reduction in armed violence. POSITIVE CHANGE
Reduction in, or disruption to, the illicit trade and transfer of SALW. POSITIVE CHANGE
Improved perceptions of human security. POSITIVE CHANGE
An effective and functioning National SALW Commission. NEUTRAL CHANGE
Development and implementation of an effective National SALW Control Strategy. NEUTRAL CHANGE
Implementation of appropriate and effective weapons legislation. POSITIVE CHANGE
Building community awareness of the SALW problem. POSITIVE CHANGE
Improved social and economic development opportunities in the EU-ASAC areas of operation. POSITIVE CHANGE
Table 16:  Summary of outcome rating results
..0	 Government	perceptions	of	programme	impact
There is little doubt that the Royal Government of Cambodia consider EU-ASAC to have been a significant success 
in terms of providing direct support to the government for the control of weapons.  Senior officials were highly 
complimentary of the contribution made by EU-ASAC towards the improved stability and security in Cambodia. 
Their comments illustrate this, Positive Change:
We were very lucky that the EU responded to our request for support’.
‘EU-ASAC is seen in Cambodia as the Doctor who helped fix the people’.
‘EU-ASAC stopped the cycle of circulation of weapons.  We used to collect, they went to bad storage, they leaked 
and we collected them again’.
The Ministry of Interior provided an interesting perspective of the impact that effective SALW Control has had, 
which was not considered by the evaluation team during their preparation work.  They stated, that in the first 
six-monthly figures on casualties from mines and UXO since the new Arms Law was passed, a 50% reduction in 
casualties has been seen.  Whilst it is obviously too early to make a direct correlation between the new Arms Law 
and casualty reduction from UXO, the Ministry of Interior seem convinced that the fact that people now knew 
that they were not allowed to possess or trade in weapons, ammunition and explosives has had a significant 
impact on the ‘extraction of explosives from ammunition for scrap metal’ trade that flourishes in some rural 
communities.  This requires further analysis, as if true, it would be a completely unforeseen benefit, and EU-ASAC 
will investigate this further in their final months.
  Major General Son Kim Sorn, Director of Military Equuipment, Ministry of Defence and Major General Ouk Kim Lek, Director of the 
Department of Weapons and Explosives, Ministry of Interior.  Held on 05 June 2006.
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Another indication of the impact of the EU-ASAC programme from the perspective of the Royal Government of 
Cambodia can be illustrated by the formal recognition of their work and commitment. The EU-ASAC team were 
presented with a wide range of Cambodian national honours and awards during the programme, which are at 
Annex H.  Positive Change.
..	 Community	perceptions	of	programme	impact
The WGWR, as the leading disarmament NGO in Cambodia, certainly felt that EU-ASAC had made a major 
contribution to gaining effective control of illicit weapons and the improvement in perceptions of human security, 
(see paragraph 4.3.2).  This was supported by the findings of the limited SALW Perceptions Survey (SAPS) 
conducted by the evaluation team, (which will be published under separate cover).  Positive Change.
.	 Capacity	building	and	sustainability
..	 RCAF	and	Police	development
The evaluation team included in the confirmatory SAPS, questions related to levels of confidence villagers had in 
the effectiveness of the local police. The following table lists the findings:
FINDINGS IMPACT
Recognition of police as security providers POSITIVE CHANGE
Belief in necessity of reporting crime POSITIVE CHANGE
Perceived improvement in police efficiency POSITIVE CHANGE
Table 17: Villagers’ confidence in the police
All respondents were, however, unaware that the police in their respective Communes had received any training, 
and this could have positively contributed to perceptions held by villagers of the capacity of their local police force 
and thus raised expectations of, and levels of confidence in police performance. 
It also emerged that although villagers rated police performance to have improved, as they did relations between 
the police and villagers, there were still complaints that police response to requests for assistance weren’t always 
very rapid. This can be attributed to lack of police on the ground (as stated by most Commune Police Chiefs) and 
a continuing need for necessary equipment (in communication and transport). But several respondents noted 
that it was also necessary and not uncommon to have to pay the police for their services. One respondent even 
complained that the police do not always punish the perpetrators so when they return to the village they seek 
revenge on the individual who reported them. Replicating the police family support project (detailed in section 
4.2.8.2) elsewhere would certainly have alleviated this problem.
..	 CSO	and	NGO	development
Cooperation with civil society and the development of NGO capacity was a consistent requirement of the EU-
ASAC mandate under the Joint Action.  EU-ASAC therefore engaged with civil society in three major areas; 
1) consultation on the development of SALW policy and legislation; 2) WfD implementation partnerships; and 
3) cooperation in SALW Awareness activities.
The development of the new ‘Arms Laws’ was undertaken with full transparency and consultation with civil 
society and in particular the Working Group for Weapons Reduction (WGWR).  Consultation with civil society on 
new legislation is not yet common practice in Cambodia, and it is primarily due to the efforts of EU-ASAC that civil 
society advice to the National Assembly and Senate in April/May 2005 gained support for the legislative process 
that resulted in the promulgation of the new national ‘Arms Law’.  Positive Change.
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The partnership with NGOs for the implementation of the development incentives to support weapons collection 
during 2001 - 2003 was an important component in their success, as it made a major contribution to community 
perspectives and support.  Local NGOs were used to construct and repair water wells.  Generally this was 
successful, although some of the NGOs had problems meeting the necessary development or design ‘standards’. 
This risk had already been identified, as it was considered that some NGOs would lack the capacity for efficient 
project implementation, but a risk management process was implemented in order to try and allow the NGOs to 
develop capacity and to stimulate NGO cooperation with local authorities .  Positive Change.
Two of the NGOs that were involved in SALW awareness activities, one of which conducted the training for the 
police family support project, stated the following gains in terms of organisational capacity and employee 
capability: 
PROJECT	ACTIVITY BENEFITS	
(ORGANISATION)
BENEFITS		
(EMPLOYEE)
RATING
SALW Awareness
Recognition and credibility 
from the local authorities. 
Recognition and credibility from the Local 
Authorities. POSITIVE CHANGE
Enhanced trust amongst 
villagers.
Skills in project management and 
budgeting, as well as weapons collection 
strategies.
POSITIVE CHANGE
Knowledge of weapons law, weapons 
issues and information dissemination 
strategies.
POSITIVE CHANGE
Police wife training 
(VMG and VMPF) Credibility for future projects. 
Knowledge of nutrition education, VMG 
and VMPF. POSITIVE CHANGE
Skills on training trainers. POSITIVE CHANGE
Table 18: Increase in the capacity of local NGOs
In addition, NGO involvement had the advantage of monitoring the work of the police both in terms of recognition 
for the police’s good work and to ensure that no individuals were threatened or punished when voluntarily 
surrendering weapons. As such, NGOs played a pivotal role in encouraging individuals to surrender their 
weapons.
During the initial stages of EU-ASAC engagement the Working Group for Weapons Reduction (WGWR) was a 
network of a wide range of NGOs that engaged to some degree or another in SALW related activities.  However, 
with the support of EU-ASAC, WGWR has evolved into an NGO in its own right that engages exclusively on SALW 
and Armed Violence Prevention issues.  The Executive Director of WGWR considers that EU-ASAC has had the 
following impact on WGWR:
n	 Contributed to an improvement of the networking capability leading to WGWR evolving into an NGO;
n	 Provided needed technical advice on SALW awareness;
n	 Facilitated NGO access to government, leading to partnership;
n	 Provided much needed financial support to operational SALW Awareness activities; and
n	 Improved visibility of the SALW issue, thereby preparing the ground for wider NGO engagement.
WGWR are concerned that the completion of the EU-ASAC mandate may lead the international community to 
conclude that the SALW issue has been completed in Cambodia.  Whilst this is true in terms of bringing the 
  NGO Phnomsrey Association for Development (PSAD) conducted SALW awareness activities in Kampong Cham and NGO Takmeo 
Community for Development of Agriculture and Industry (TCAID) conducted both SALW awareness activities and training for police wives as 
part of the police family support project in Preah Vihear. The evaluation team conducted interviews with both the Directors of the NGO and 
field staff who worked during the project’s implementation. 
  This was confirmed by remarks from District and Provincial authorities.
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conflict weapons under control, as a post-conflict activity, WGWR emphasised that there were still significant 
SALW issues remaining in terms of the criminal use of weapons and armed violence.
.	 Synergies	and	coordination	
One of the consistent mandated tasks of EU-ASAC was to support project implementation by other donors and, 
by implication, to ensure coordination between SALW Control stakeholders.  This was a time intensive task, which 
committed considerable human resources to developing and maintaining the necessary relationships. As a result 
the cooperation and synergy between different stakeholders was usually good throughout the programme life. 
Positive Change.
4.4.1 World Food Programme (WFP)
The evaluation of this particular synergistic component is the one that has caused the evaluation team the 
most thought, and some concern in regard to perceptions of conditionality.  A WfD activity was developed in 
partnership with the WFP, during 2001 - 2002 in Kratie (Snuol) and Pursat (Bakan), based on the concept that 
an incentive for the community as a whole to surrender weapons would result in much needed food for the 
community.  In effect, weapons surrendered by the community resulted in work opportunities for food (rice) 
for the whole community to build effective access routes (roads).  The results in terms of community social 
and economic development can be illustrated by the fact that the journey time from Phnom Penh to Snuol was 
reduced from 1.5 days to approximately 4 hours, with the obvious impact on social and living conditions that this 
enabled.  Funding for this development work was provided by the WFP, working in partnership with EU-ASAC, and 
resulted in 121 tonnes of rice been provided in return for 6.85 kilometres of road in Pursat, and 100 tonnes of 
rice for 5 sections of road in Kratie.
This is probably one of the first examples of the real operational mainstreaming of SALW Control interventions 
that has had a visible impact within wider humanitarian or development projects.  Yet little visibility or analysis 
was paid at the time (2002) and lessons that could be identified are now difficult to develop in retrospect for 
future implementation. Indeed the evaluation team is not yet convinced of the future applications of this activity 
in a wider global perspective, although the opportunities are obvious, if possibly controversial. 
The concept was based on individuals surrendering weapons as part of a real wider community need for 
humanitarian aid in the form of food.  Once weapons were surrendered the community had ‘earned’ the right to 
build much-needed access roads in return for food.  At a first analytical view, this projects an image of ‘conditional 
development’, but this was certainly not the institutional perspective of the WFP at the time.  The need for food 
for these communities was obvious, and WFP support in the form of rice would inevitably have been forthcoming 
anyway. Notwithstanding this, liaison or synergy between the two programmes, (WFP and EU-ASAC), was identified, 
which resulted in food delivery for voluntary weapons surrender. There was literally no other development or 
humanitarian aid available in Snuol at that time, and there is certainly little doubt that the community as a whole 
had themselves linked the voluntary surrender of weapons to road building, and hence food.  Whilst the WFP had 
made no direct conditional linkage between weapons surrender, development work and food, the perceptions 
of the community were probably very different.  This is both an operational and moral issue that requires much 
more analysis and is outside the time and space limitations of the evaluation team to pursue in more analytical 
detail.  The inevitable conclusion that interventions at the time resulted in; 1) much needed food being supplied 
to all individuals; 2) the access roads built by community members have had a very positive impact on economic 
development within that community; 3) weapons were surrendered, put beyond use or stigmatised within that 
society; and 4) perceptions of human security have been much improved, is unarguable.  What needs to be 
resolved is the perception of a concept of, or indeed a possible future for, conditional community disarmament 
under very specific circumstances.  Future operational research is required.  Finally if any defence is needed for 
this particular humanitarian or development activity, it must be placed in the context that armed military and 
police were required to provide protection during the intervention at that time; there is now no need for that sort 
of response to protect the development work that is still conducted in the area.
In terms of the EU-ASAC intervention, ‘guns for roads for food’, in partnership with the WFP, was certainly a 
success within the very limited geographical area in which it was implemented at that time.  A precedence 
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had been set within Cambodia at that time, and it is very likely that had EU-ASAC had the external bi-lateral 
donor support to be able to continue with their larger WfD activities post 2002, that this type of ‘conditional 
development, could have been explored, (or even exploited), further within certain communities in Cambodia.
4.4.2 Japanese Assistance Team for Small Arms Management in Cambodia (JSAC)
From 2000 - 2002 the EU-ASAC programme was a good example of how effective coordination by a lead 
organization, with technical competence and good government liaison, can maximize the coherence and impact 
of international support. Japan initially chose to provide their funding support to the EU-ASAC programme in 2001. 
However, in 2003 the Government of Japan established a parallel programme (JSAC) that directly replicated the 
EU-ASAC programmes within areas that they had identified through their previous support.  JSAC have tried to 
follow the successful EU-ASAC methodology, and indeed even use the same storage building designs, technical 
procedures for stockpile management and computer software developed by EU-ASAC.  Yet JSAC still lack the 
technical knowledge within their team necessary for really effective replication.  Although JSAC chose to operate 
in different provinces (in the north-east of the country) and focused on the police, it was still not a particularly 
helpful approach in terms of a wider international community approach to coordination and cooperation.  An 
effective response was already in place, which the Government of Japan had financially supported, yet for their 
own political reasons they chose to establish a separate project.  Although one of the JSAC team had worked 
previously with EU-ASAC, they still did not appear to have the operational experience or breadth of technical 
knowledge to work from first principles, and hence their technical capability to respond to changing dynamics on 
the ground has been very limited.
From Box 5 it can be seen that whilst EU-ASAC was 
concentrating on the delivery of counter-proliferation 
measures (2003 - 2005), and NGO managed micro-
WfD activities (2003 only), the focus of JSAC was 
on large-scale WFD activities.  This is a surprising 
decision as both the Government of Cambodia and 
EU-ASAC had by then the evidence and indicators 
to suggest that NGO managed small-scale WfD 
activities targeted at specific communities would 
have more impact, and would certainly be more cost 
effective in terms of cost per weapon surrendered. 
Large-scale WfD activities in Cambodia at that time 
had a number of disadvantages; 
n	 Community participation was limited; 
n	 They were too management intensive; 
n	 They were geographically constrained and lacked flexibility to respond to other community approaches for 
WfD activities within a realistic timeframe; 
n	 They were generally regarded as development work and not SALW control activities;
n	 The concept of ‘conditional development’ within the WFP partnership had not been fully explored; and 
n	 The distribution of weapons after all the previous SALW collection work (1998 - 2002) perhaps could 
not really justify a large-scale WfD approach in terms of efficiency or cost benefits in terms of pure SALW 
control, (See paragraph 4.2.2 for background).
It would therefore not be unreasonable to conclude that whereas EU-ASAC was primarily a SALW control 
programme using limited development as incentives, it can be argued that JSAC is still primarily a development 
programme that used SALW as the entry point.  Although JSAC have begun engagement with the Police on the 
development of safe storage, the Ministry of Interior consider that progress is still slow.  JSAC has benefited from 
access to the technical knowledge and experience of the EU-ASAC team, but it is difficult to see how JSAC can 
  Source:  http://www.online.com.kh/~adm.jsac/topENG.html.  Other minor incentives included Ponds, Toilets and Agricultural Training.
Box 5: Effectiveness (Outputs) (2003 - 2005)
EU-ASAC JSAC
Budget (Euro) 4,380,518 3,180,000
Weapons Destroyed 62,377 15,646
Weapons Depots Constructed 32 3
Weapons Placed in Secure Storage 117,570 6,132
Weapons Collected 1,014 (2003 Only)
11,662 
Weapons Caches Cleared 9 0
Incentive Delivery (Schools Built) 0 10
Incentive Delivery (Water Wells) 200 28
Incentive Delivery (Roads) (Km) 0 27
Incentive Delivery (Bridges) 0 1
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sustain effective SALW Control, as opposed to development, operations in the post-EU-ASAC period when this 
knowledge base is lost to them.
4.4.3 Coordination with the EU Delegation (Cambodia)
When the EU-ASAC programme started on the ground in 2000 the EU had a Technical Cooperation Office (TCO) 
in Phnom Penh, which only became a Delegation on December 2001.  The Head of Delegation is accredited and 
based in Bangkok, with the Phnom Penh office under the control of a Charge d’Affairs.  The EU-ASAC project 
manager has maintained close liaison links with the other EU initiatives, but as neither the Commissions’ Country 
Strategy  paper (2000 - 2003) and the National Indicative Programme (NIP)  (2005 - 2006) included either 
SALW Control or SSR in their planned activities closer cooperation with other EU activities in Cambodia was not 
possible.
Although little formal cooperation between the EU Mission and EU-ASAC activities was possible, due to the differing 
priorities of engagement, there is little doubt that the EU-ASAC programme has made a significant contribution to 
improving the visibility of the EU within Cambodia.  The programme has been supported at the highest political 
levels within the Royal Government of Cambodia, with weapons destruction activities been attended by a range 
of government ministers, (including the Prime Minister).  The programme is also well known at community level 
within Cambodia, and is considered by the international SALW community as one of the pioneering activities at 
the operational level.
..	 Disarmament	Forum
The Disarmament Forum is a framework for information exchange between organizations working on SALW 
Control related issues within Cambodia.  EU-ASAC, JCCP, JSAC and WGWR are members.  Meetings are held on 
a regular basis, and are mainly intended to try and ensure deconfliction of responses, although issues such as 
‘technical standards’ are also raised.
  No opinion was formed by the evaluation team of either the cost effectiveness or the efficiency of the JSAC development components.
  Activities included trade infrastructure, customs procedures, tariffs and NGO support in agro-business. Conflict resolution activities under 
the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights were also covered. 
  The priorities of the NIP are pro-poor economic growth, social sector support and governance.  As the governance priority targeted the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance (MoEF), there was little opportunity for synergy with EU-ASAC activities.
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	 Programme	management
.	 General
The Joint Action of 1999 to support the Royal Government of Cambodia in SALW Control issues was essentially 
a political decision under the CFSP.  This resulted in the appointment of a Special Advisor to the European 
Commission, who also acted as the Project Manager.  This differs significantly to development projects, which 
are usually determined on the basis of a country strategy paper (written by EC officials in consultation with the 
government concerned).
The appointment of a Special Advisor to implement the Joint Action meant that EU-ASAC did not follow typical 
development cooperation procedures, and therefore differed from typical European external aid programmes. 
The Special Advisor was provided with appropriate flexibility to respond to the political, security and operational 
dynamics on the ground and to make recommendations to CODUN on the detailed activities of EU-ASAC for 
the next funding year.  This proved to be an effective system, which allowed the delivery of capability based on 
the then identified needs, balanced against available resources, and based on best technical and operational 
practices.  As SALW Control was still a very new concept at the inception of the EU-ASAC programme, and there 
were virtually no ‘best practices’ or international standards to base the programme on, the flexibility allowed to 
the programme was essential if it was to be able to respond to lessons learned on the ground.  The programme 
would succeed or fail depending on the experience, judgement and technical knowledge of the EU-ASAC team. 
The disadvantage of the approach was the need for the project manager to operate within an annual funding 
cycle.
The fact that EU-ASAC employed experienced specialists in each of the project component across their range 
of activities meant that appropriate responses could be developed from first principles, and then tested (if 
necessary) during ‘pilot projects’.  Specific components were developed that were Achievable, Measurable and 
Verifiable, rather than as broad aspirations.  The quality of the programme staff, relying on competent specialists 
  for the component parts, rather than generalists, was one of the keys to the success of the programme. 
It also ensured that EU-ASAC fulfilled its ‘Duty of Care’ in ensuring that the inherent risks in the collection and 
storage of weapons, ammunition and explosives were reduced to a ‘tolerable’ level (as defined in ISO Guide 51 
- Safety).
.	 Annual	funding	cycle
There is a range of evidence to suggest that the implementation of an annual funding cycle constrained the 
developmental components of the programme.  Not only is it difficult to negotiate, develop and implement 
individual large-scale Weapons for Development components, whilst complying with international standards of 
tendering and procurement, within a calendar year, but it also leads to a reduction in potential impacts.  Annual 
funding cycles do not take account of the influence of factors such as weather, access to the terrain, political 
developments (such as elections), capability of national counterparts to work within programme timelines etc. 
There is great pressure of the programme team to deliver capability within the year, and it makes identification 
of synergies with other projects, and the development and implementation of longer term strategies much more 
difficult.  For a programme team to commit to activities beyond the funding cycle runs the great risk of raising 
expectations, which cannot then be subsequently met.
In the case of EU-ASAC there is little doubt that the annual funding cycle did constrain their capability in terms of 
the large-scale WfD component, but it is the opinion of the evaluation team that this was more than offset by the 
flexibility of operational response allowed under the Special Advisor system of programme management.
  Competent in this context refers to ‘competence’.  An individuals ‘competence’ to perform a task is based on a combination of their 
training, education and operational experience.  Just because an individual has 20 years experience in a task area does not necessarily 
equate to ‘competence’, as their initial training may have been flawed.
  The EU-ASAC programme employed internationally qualified and experienced specialists in Weapons, Ammunition and Explosives 
Management, Explosive Ordnance Disposal and Law.
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.	 Financial	issues
5.3.1 Costs (2000 - 2005)
The EU-ASAC programme budget and independently audited expenditure0 for the EU-ASAC programme (2000 
- 2005) against thematic activities is summarised in Table 19. The remaining financial period from January - 
September 2006  was still ongoing at the time of the evaluation, but will be subject to an independent external 
audit, and the indicators are that a similar financial profile can be expected, (a predicted expenditure summary 
is at Annex G.
EXPENSES BUDGET	
(€)
EXPENDITURE	
(€)
EXPENDITURE		
(%)
REMARKS
1.     Human Resources
1.1   International Staff € 2,085,024 € 1,895,765 31.1 %
1.2   National Staff € 373,711 € 319,579 5.3 %
1.3   Insurance Costs € 85,568 € 56,672 0.9 %
Sub Total (1) € 2,544,303 € 2,272,016 37.0%
2.     Travel Costs € 320,509 € 209,157 3.4 %
3.     Operational / Administration Costs € 396,901 € 309,397 5.1 %
Sub Total (2 - 3) € 717,410 € 518,554 8.5 %
4.     Operational Components
4.1   Legislative and Regulatory € 116,548 € 33,124 0.15 %
4.2   Weapons for Development (Large) € 627,000 € 415,439 6.8 %
4.3   Weapons for Development (NGO) € 658,236 € 440,369 7.2 %
4.4   SALW Collection (Weapons Caches) € 105,000 € 32,983 0.5 %
€ 52.86 per weapon 
(For 624 weapons)	
4.4   Weapons Destruction € 523,885 € 338,697 5.6 % € 2.65 per weapon(For 127,766 weapons) 
4.5.1   Stockpile Management and Security (RCAF) € 1,585,964 € 1,410,503 23.2 % € 10.83 per weapon
(For 151,614 weapons)4.5.1   Stockpile Management and Security (Police) € 254,900 € 231,098 3.8 %
4.6   SALW Awareness and CSO Development € 491,804 € 381,818 6.3 %
4.7   Police Capacity Development € 0 € 0 0 % Funded entirely from external donations.
Sub Total (4) € 4,390,337 € 3,284,031 53.9 %
5.    Contingencies € 284,960 € 14,595 0.2 %
6.    Totals € 7,937,010 €6,089,196 100.0 %
7.    Balance  € 1,847,814 23.3 % of Budget Expenditure (Delivery) was 76.7% of Budget. 
Table 19:  EU-ASAC Expenditure Summary
0  This matrix only includes EU funding donations.  Additional resources mobilized have been reported on to the individual donors.
  Including closing down period of July - September 2006.
  Rounded as appropriate to one decimal place.
 This expenditure also covers the costs of ammunition destruction, the training in offensive search and seizure methodologies and the 
provision of search capability for the RCAF and Police.  Operational costs for the recovery of future weapons from caches, (per weapon), will 
be much less as this figure includes the initial training and ‘start up’ costs.
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5.3.2 Benefits
One financial benefit of the programme is that over € 4.8 million (78%) of the expended funds were injected 
directly into the Cambodian economy.
It can be estimated that the income generated for both villagers and police wives as a result of the VMPF and 
VMG activities has increased by between 40 - 50%. The average disposable income in the targeted villages per 
household used to be approximately €1 per month, so for 15 police families and between 600 and 900 village 
households, the total income generated for all beneficiaries from this project since its implementation has been 
approximately € 615 and € 915 per month. This may seem insignificant in European terms, but represents a 
major injection of income for the families concerned in a country where 75% of the population are still reliant on 
subsistence farming for survival.
5.3.3 Value Added Tax (VAT)
The project was not registered as an official foreign organisation and could therefore not reclaim VAT (at the 
rate of 10%) on items purchased.  However, it operated as an international organisation and therefore was not 
charged VAT for major items such as construction work for weapons depots. The estimated cost to the project 
was therefore minimal.
..	 Additional	resources	mobilized
The funding arrangements for EU-ASAC under the auspices of the CFSP budget had an expectation that the 
core funds allocated under CFSP would be complemented by individual contributions from Member States. For 
example the WfD funding for the activities in Bakan and Snoul districts was allocated on the understanding 
that additional funds would be provided by other donors. The programme was, to a degree, successful in the 
mobilization of resources from other external donors to support project components, (Table 20).  (This equates 
to an additional 14.8% to the EU budgeted funding):
DATES VALUE (€)	 DONOR PROJECT	COMPONENTS PROVINCES
2000 16,100 UK 	Support to ‘Code of Conduct’ development conference. 	Phnom Penh
2001 28,531 Canada 	Support for police training 	Various
2001 150,336 Japan 	Support for WfD 	Pursat
2001 363,025 Netherlands 	Support for WfD 	Kratie
2002 80,500 Germany 	Support for police capacity development 	Pursat
2003 80,500 Germany 	Support to police community training. 	Various
2003 250,000 Netherlands 	Support to SALW Stockpile Management 	Siem Reap (MR 4)
2003 77,280 UK 	UK support for CBP. 	Preah Vihear
2004 222,366 Netherlands 	Support to SALW Stockpile Management 	Kampong Speu (MR 3)
Sub-Total 1,089,771 (EU Member States)
Sub-Total 178,876 (Non- EU States)
TOTAL 1,268,638
Table 20:  Summary of additional resources mobilized by the EU-ASAC programme
  Based on the assumption that approximately 30% of international staff salaries would be spent within Cambodia.
  Currencies converted at May 2006 UN Exchange rate of $ 1.00 = € 0.8050, and CA $ = € 0.6993.
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Resource mobilization was however complicated by the fact that only two of the traditional SALW donors had a 
major diplomatic presence in Cambodia, (Germany and UK), with the remainder been located in Bangkok.  As a 
travel budget was not allocated to the Project Manager specifically for resource mobilization issues, (other than 
regular reporting to CODUN in Brussels), it was difficult to make the necessary personal approaches to donors 
that are so valuable in terms of securing funding.
5.4 Quality Assurance (QA) systems
..	 Monitoring and verification	issues
Although the programme has been the subject of a number of assessments by academic institutions and 
NGOs, there have been no structured progress or mid-term evaluations during the period of the programme. 
Notwithstanding this, a stringent reporting mechanism was instituted by the EU, which required a formal annual 
report, regular cooperation with local embassies/missions of EU Member States and that the programme 
manager personally reported to the Working Group on Global Arms Control and Disarmament (CODUN) in the 
Council of Ministers.  The programme was therefore under effective political scrutiny of the EU member States, 
but no formal monitoring systems were implemented to measure project efficiency or verification systems to 
identify outcomes during its life.
..	 Financial	probity
The following independent financial audits of the EU-ASAC programme have taken place, and copies forwarded 
to the EU.  No major issues were identified:
DATE AUDITORS MAJOR	FINDINGS
15 Nov 01 Morison Kak and Associés
	No major issues of non-compliance identified related to the use of funds, 
payroll documentation, contractual procedures or control of fixed assets.
	A number of observations were made relating to internal and management 
controls, which were all satisfactorily resolved during the next accounting 
period.
31 Dec 02 Morison Kak & Associés
	No significant observations.
31 Dec 03 Morison Kak & Associés
31 Dec 04 Morison Kak & Associés
31 Dec 05 Morison Kak & Associés
30 Sep 06 Morison Kak & Associés 	To be conducted.
Table 21:  Independent audits of the EU-ASAC programme
  In the context of SALW Control, the term refers to ‘the authorised observation by qualified personnel of sites, activities or processes 
without taking responsibility for that being observed.  This is usually carried out to check conformity with undertakings, procedures or 
standard practice and often includes recording and reporting elements’.
  Confirmation, through the provision of objective evidence that specified requirements have been fulfilled.  [ISO 9000:2000]
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6 Conclusions and ‘Lessons Identified’
.	 Impact
EU-ASAC has had a major impact in sustaining the momentum of the Royal Government of Cambodia on SALW 
Control issues, which has led to much improved stability within the country.  Their work has resulted in the 
implementation of good standards of safety and security, supported by appropriate legislation and procedures. 
The political support of the Royal Government of Cambodia, the development of activities in partnership with 
government and communities, combined with the high technical and professional competence of the EU-ASAC 
team were all major contributory factors in the success of the programme. This has all been achieved at a 
relatively modest financial cost, and illustrates the positive impact on security and stability that well-managed 
and targeted SALW Control interventions can have.
Objective evidence suggests that of the estimated number of weapons in circulation in 1991, over 82% have 
been brought under effective government control or destroyed.  As a result the risks of proliferation, leakages or 
export of surpluses to inappropriate clients have all reduced significantly.
Community and individual perceptions of human security have improved to such a degree that over 87% of 
people feel safer now than they did three years ago, although they are still worried about armed violence and 
crime.  Homicides using firearms have reduced by 70%. This improvement in both perceived and real security 
has acted as a stimulant for economic growth.  Since 1999, GDP (PPP) has increased by 55%, GDI by 43% and 
GDP per capita by 39%.
Armed violence is regrettably still a factor within Cambodian society, primarily with the continued criminal and 
gang use of weapons, and the use of knifes is now emerging as the primary tool of household violence and 
low-level criminal activity.  There is now a growing perception within communities that perhaps it may again be 
useful for them to possess a weapon for self-protection.  This is not a positive development, and the international 
community and the Royal Government of Cambodia should investigate measures to target armed violence and 
criminal gangs if the major achievements made to date in the control of weapons are not to be placed at risk.
The law on ‘the Management of Weapons, Explosives and Ammunition of the Kingdom of Cambodia’ was adopted 
by the National Assembly and Senate during 2005, and reflects international ‘best practices’ in terms of the 
principles for regulatory control of SALW.  Yet the effective implementation of certain aspects relies on a series of 
sub-decrees, which have not been adopted.  The law is therefore, partially unenforceable at the moment.
The EU-ASAC programme has also had an impact outside Cambodia in terms of the development of ‘best 
practices’ and methodologies for the wider SALW community.  Many of their techniques have been included in 
international and regional DDR and SALW Control standards and guidelines.
.	 Programme	development	and	management
The programme documentation did not always clearly identify results in terms of ‘impact’, and progress towards 
those results was hence difficult to measure both quantitatively and qualitatively.  Impact data is difficult to 
collect in Cambodia, and although in an ideal world support to the Royal Government of Cambodia in developing 
data collection and collation mechanisms would be highly desirable, the reality is that this could be a 10 year 
project in its own right; more resources would be committed to developing data mechanisms than in the practical 
SALW Control components on the ground.  
The programme was highly effective in terms of the delivery of ‘technical components’, but the principles of 
‘results based management’, if formally adopted at the outset could have resulted in more effective monitoring 
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systems to measure detailed ‘impact’ throughout the programme, rather than the subjective assessment that 
took place.  This would have enabled the project team to make management decisions based on ‘impact’ 
indicators rather than their subjective assessment.  A positive aspect, however, was that programme development 
was a participatory process that involved substantial consultation with local and government counterparts and 
partners. 
Notwithstanding that a results based management concept was not used as a primary means of focusing on 
component deliverables and impacts, the principles of the project management cycle were followed by the 
programme team.
The adoption of an annual funding mechanism constrained the ability of the EU-ASAC programme to deliver 
long-term WfD strategies, or to engage in any longer term activities to control weapons within Cambodia.  It is 
now generally accepted that impact of SALW Control programmes are mid- to long-term in nature and therefore 
should be supported by multi-year funding mechanisms.  (Indeed the very success of EU-ASAC shows the impact 
that sustainable funding can have - but it can be more efficiently and effectively committed if allocated on a 
multi-year basis).
.	 Future	synergies	and	needs
6.3.1 Armed Violence Prevention (AVP) and SALW Control
Although the link between armed violence and weapons was identified during the project conception phase, EU-
ASAC was not mandated to engage in crime prevention related issues.  This is primarily because the funding was 
allocated under the EU Joint Action on SALW, which is specifically focused on areas such as collection, destruction, 
stockpile management, legislation etc.  Therefore no activities, such as the development of a weapons intelligence 
capability etc, were included to target the criminal use of weapons.  Experience gained on other SALW Control 
interventions now suggests that this is an important component of a holistic SALW control strategy, and future 
EU supported interventions should also consider this component during programme development.
..	 Security	Sector	Reform
Similarly the synergies between some of the more ‘technical’ aspects of SALW Control, such as SALW destruction 
and stockpile management, also support wider security sector reform (SSR).   SALW Control offers an entry point 
to wider SSR, of which much remains to be done in Cambodia on police reform and capacity development.
Of particular concern is the safety, security and control of the ammunition stockpiles within Cambodia.  EU-ASAC 
was not mandated to engage on wider ammunition issues, although they have identified the threat and future 
options.  There are estimated to be over 100,000 tonnes of ammunition present in Cambodia, the vast majority 
of which is stored in unsafe and insecure conditions.  It presents a real security threat, which could negate all 
the good work done implementing the control of the weapons, which can easily be operationally replaced by 
self-contained rocket launchers, detonators and explosives, thereby increasing the threshold of violence during 
any future periods of political instability, terrorist or criminal activities.  The ammunition stockpiles also pose a 
significant humanitarian threat to the safety of local communities; and there have been explosions at ammunition 
depots caused by stockpile instability0 resulting in six fatalities and 20 injured.  It is inevitable that there will be 
many more unless this problem is addressed as a matter of priority.
  1) Identification of problems and opportunities; 2) Programme and component design; 3) Programme and component implementation; 
and 4) Evaluation of results and programme redesign.
  Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Adrian Sprangmeijer. Improved Safe Storage of Ammunition and Explosives for the Royal Cambodian Armed 
Forces - A Feasibility Study. EU-ASAC. Phnom Penh. June 2006.
0  29 August 1999 - Ream, and 31 March 2005 - Andong Chen, Battambang.
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	 Recommendations
The establishment of EU-ASAC as a Joint Action under the daily operational management of a Special Advisor has 
many advantages in terms of the ability of a programme to respond to changing security, political and economic 
dynamics on the ground.  This flexibility is important for SALW Control interventions because of their need to 
engage in the development, security and humanitarian sectors.  The EU should consider this approach for future 
SALW Control programmes in support of national governments, where appropriate.
Balanced against the above recommendation is the need for longer funding cycles.  The EU should consider 
funding cycles of two years or more for future SALW Control programmes. 
Future SALW Control programmes of the EU should not constrain themselves to just specific functional areas of 
SALW Control such as weapons collection or weapons destruction.  They should be provided with the mandate 
and capability to engage in all areas of SALW Control, as holistic and integrated strategies and responses are 
more efficient, effective and have longer-term impact.
Further SALW Control support is still needed by the Royal Government of Cambodia, particularly in terms of; 
1) legislation implementation; 2) the development of an effective National SALW Commission and National 
SALW Control Strategy; 3) activities to address armed violence as a social and development issue; 4) the 
implementation of an effective Code of Conduct to ensure police compliance with international best practices; 
5) improvement of police capability to tackle the criminal use of weapons; 6) the development of democratic 
oversight mechanisms to support SALW Control measures; 7) the development of safe and secure ammunition 
storage and management systems; and 8) the disposal of thousands of tonnes of surplus or unsafe ammunition. 
The international community should address this as a matter of priority if the achievements to date are to be 
sustained.
  UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, (General Assembly Resolution 34/169 of 17 December 1979) and UN Basic 
Principles for the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, (Adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the 
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, 27 August to 07 September 1990).
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Annex A - Evaluation Results Matrix - Legislation and Regulatory 
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Annex B - Evaluation Results Matrix - SALW (Weapons) Collection 
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Annex C  - Evaluation Results Matrix - SALW (Weapons) 
Destruction (Outputs)
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Annex D - Evaluation Results Matrix - Stockpile Management and 
Security (Outputs)
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Annex E - Evaluation Results Matrix - SALW Awareness and CSO 
Development (Outputs)
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Annex F - Evaluation Results Matrix - Police Capacity Development 
(Outputs)
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Annex G - Predicted expenditure summary 2006
EXPENSES BUDGET (€) EXPENDITURE	
(€)
EXPENDITURE	
(%)
REMARKS
1.     Human Resources
1.1   International Staff € 139,000 € 139,000 33%
1.2   National Staff € 162.200 € 14,285 3%
1.3   Insurance Costs € 7,600 € 6,327 1%
Sub Total (1)  € 162,800 € 152,612 37%
2.     Travel Costs € 17,300 € 13,538 3%
3.     Operational / Administration Costs € 60,950 € 46,220 11%
Sub Total (2 - 3)  € 78,250 € 59,757 14%
4.     Operational Components
4.1   Legislative and Regulatory € 0.00 € 0.00
4.2   Weapons for Development (Large) € 0.00 € 0.00
4.3   Weapons for Development (NGO) € 0.00 € 0.00
4.4   SALW Collection (Weapons Caches) € 0.00 € 0.00
4.4   Weapons Destruction € 32,100 € 46,523 11%
4.5.1   Stockpile Management and Security 
(RCAF) € 236,710 € 165,417 38%
4.5.1   Stockpile Management and Security 
(Police) € 0.00 € 0.00
4.6   SALW Awareness and CSO Development € 0.00 € 0.00
4.7   Police Capacity Development € 0.00 € 0.00 0 %
Sub Total (4) € 268,810 € 211,940 49%
5.    Contingencies € 3,140 € 0.00 0%
6.    Totals € 513,000 € 431,309
7.    Balance € 81,691
  Rounded as appropriate to one decimal place.
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Annex H - EU-ASAC Honours and Awards
DATE HONOUR / AWARD RECIPIENT
2001 National Construction Medal Henny van den Graaf 
2001 National Construction Medal Alain Perigaud
21 Dec 01 Gold Medal of the Order of Sahametrei EU ASAC (Institutional Award)
21 Dec 01 Gold Medal of the Order of Sahametrei Henny van den Graaf 
21 Dec 01 Silver Medal of the Order of Sahametrei Alain Perigaud
21 Dec 01 Silver Medal of the Order of Sahametrei Adrian Sprangemeijer
21 Dec 01 Silver Medal of the Order of Sahametrei Robin Poulton
21 Dec 01 Silver Medal of the Order of Sahametrei Dennis Brennan
21 Dec 01 Silver Medal of the Order of Sahametrei Marc Vanhemelryck
21 Dec 01 Silver Medal of the Order of Sahametrei Neil Wilford
21 Dec 01 Silver Medal for Services to the Cambodian People Ms Yos Srey Vy
21 Dec 01 Silver Medal for Services to the Cambodian People Ms Mao Chan Chakriya
21 Dec 01 Silver Medal for Services to the Cambodian People Ms Dan Pisey
21 Dec 01 Silver Medal for Services to the Cambodian People Mak Monyrath
21 Dec 01 Silver Medal for Services to the Cambodian People Kry Davuth
21 Dec 01 Silver Medal for Services to the Cambodian People Chou Bounine
21 Dec 01 Silver Medal for Services to the Cambodian People Chao Noly
21 Dec 01 Silver Medal for Services to the Cambodian People Seng Son
28 Oct 02 Chevalier of the Order of Sahametrei EU ASAC (Institutional Award)
28 Oct 02 Chevalier of the Order of Sahametrei David de Beer
28 Oct 02 Chevalier of the Order of Sahametrei Alain Perigaud
03 Dec 02 Gold Medal of the Order of Sahametrei David de Beer
03 Dec 02 Gold Medal for Services to the Cambodian People Seng Son
09 Dec 05 Gold Medal for Services to the Cambodian People Net Sothai
09 Dec 05 Officer of the Order of Sahametrei  Alain Perigaud
27 Mar 06 Commander of the Order of Sahametrei David de Beer
27 Mar 06 Officer of the Order of Sahametrei Adrian Sprangemeijer
20 Jun 06 Grand Commander of the Order of Sahametrei EU ASAC (Institutional Award)
30 Jun 06 Gold Medal for Co-operation Net Sothai
30 Jun 06 Gold Medal for Co-operation Thann Bunthoeun
30 Jun 06 Bronze Medal for Co-operation Dan Pisey
30 Jun 06 Bronze Medal for Co-operation Siek Bopha
30 Jun 06 Bronze Medal for Co-operation Ath Sona
30 Jun 06 Bronze Medal for Co-operation Kry Davuth
30 Jun 06 Bronze Medal for Co-operation Mak Monyrath
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Annex J - Individuals consulted
The following individuals and organizations were consulted during the preparation of this evaluation report;
Cambodia
JSAC - Takeuchi Kazuki, Programme Manager
JSAC - Kida Yasumitsu, Project Manager
Marc Vanhemelryck - Formerly VWCP Specialist, EU-ASAC
Ministry of Defence - Major General Son Kim Sorn, Director of Military Equipment
Ministry of Interior - Major General Ouk Kim Lek, Director of the Department of Weapons and Explosives
NGO Phnomsrey Association for Development (PSAD)
NGO Takmeo Community for Development of Agriculture and Industry (TCAID)
The Community of Chikor
The Community of Kampot
The Community of Kroach Chmar
The Community of Pramath Dai
The Community of Sa Thapor
The Community of Svay Tiep
The Community of Talo
The Community of Vary Keuth
Tieng Saman - Formerly WGWR
UNDP - Douglas Gardner, Resident Representative
WGWR - Prak Tepvichet, Executive Director
European Commission
Daniela Dicorrado-Andreoni Head of Sector, Conventional Disarmament and Human Security, DG ER/A/4
Juha Auvinen Acting Head of Unit, CFSP and RRM; Programme Management, DG ER/A/3
EU-ASAC Team
David de Beer Special Advisor to the European Commission and Project Manager 
Adrian Sprangemeijer International Specialist, Weapons Destruction and Stockpile Management
Thann Bunthoeun Finance and Administration Officer
  This does not include individuals who participated during the confirmatory SALW Perceptions Survey (SAPS) component of the evaluation, 
who are too numerous to mention.  The evaluation team also wishes to thank them for their assistance and cooperation in the preparation 
of this report.
44
Evaluation of the EU Small Arms and Light Weaons  
Assistance to the Kingdom of Cambodia (EU-ASAC)
2nd Edition (2006-07-25)
Annex K - Bibliography
The following publications, documents, assessments, reports and papers were consulted during the preparation 
of this evaluation report:
Anders, Holger. Small Arms Control in Cambodia - A Field Report.  Peace Studies Journal, Volume 3, 
Issue 3. Bradford, UK. September 2002.  http://www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk/docs/Cambodia.PDF
Buwalda, Johan. Report of an Evaluation Mission in Cambodia (Weapons for Development Projects). 
Buwalda BNA. Doesburg, Netherlands. 17 October 2002.
http://www.eu-asac.org/programme/vwc/evaluationReportOctober2002.pdf
EU. European Council. Joint Action 1999/34/CFSP - The European Union’s contribution to combating 
the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons. Brussels. 17 December 
1998. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2004/l_379/l_37920041224en01110112.pdf  
EU.  European Council. Resolution 1999/730/CFSP - implementing Joint Action 1999/34/CFSP with a 
view to a European Union contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of small 
arms and light weapons in Cambodia. Brussels. 15 November 1999. 
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31999D0730:EN:HTML
EU.  European Council. Resolution 2000/724/CFSP. Brussels. 20 November 2000. 
EU.  European Council. Resolution 2001/796/CFSP. Brussels. 15 November 2001.
EU.  European Council. Resolution 2002/904/CFSP. Brussels. 11 November 2002.
EU.  European Council. Resolution 2003/806/CFSP. Brussels. 17 November 2003.
EU.  European Council. Resolution 2004/792/CFSP. Brussels. 22 November 2004.
EU.  European Council. Resolution 2005/784/CFSP. Brussels. 07 November 2005.
EU-ASAC. Annual Report 2000/2001. Phnom Penh.  31 December 2001.
EU-ASAC. Annual Report 2002. Phnom Penh.  31 December 2002.
EU-ASAC. Annual Report 2003. Phnom Penh.  31 December 2003.
EU-ASAC. Annual Report 2004. Phnom Penh.  31 December 2004.
EU-ASAC. Annual Report 2005. Phnom Penh.  31 December 2005.
Greene, Owen. EU-ASAC Interim Evaluation. Bradford, UK. 31 May 2001
GTZ. Small Arms Control in Cambodia - Lessons Learned from the EU-ASAC Programme.  Eschborn, 
Germany. 2005. http://www.gtz.de/de/dokumente/en-decosac-EUASAC-2005.pdf
Klerkx, Gerrit. Snuol Weapons for Development (WfD) Evaluation. Bangkok. March 2002.
Muggah, Robert. Listening for Change - Participatory Evaluations of DDR and Arms Reduction in Mali, 
Cambodia and Albania. UNIDIR. Geneva. 2005. 
http://www.unidir.ch/bdd/fiche-ouvrage.php?ref_ouvrage=92-9045-176-9-en
  Link to Joint Action 202/589/CFSP of 12 July 2002, which repealed 1999/34/CFSP.
45
Evaluation of the EU Small Arms and Light Weaons 
Assistance to the Kingdom of Cambodia (EU-ASAC)
2nd Edition (2006-07-25)
Mugumya, Geofrey. Exchanging Weapons for Development in Cambodia - An Assessment of Different 
Weapon Collection Strategies by Local People. UNIDIR. Geneva. June 2005. (ISBN: 92-9045-167-X). 
http://www.unidir.ch/bdd/fiche-ouvrage.php?ref_ouvrage=92-9045-167-X-en
Poulton, Robin, Seng Son and Neil Wilford. Assistance for curbing small arms and light weapons in 
Cambodia: the results after four years of fieldwork. UNIDIR Open Forum Two. 2004. 
http://www.unidir.ch/pdf/articles/pdf-art2120.pdf
Ratha, Sourn, Dianna Long and John H Vijghen. Gun and Livelihood - The Use of Small Arms and their 
Impact on People’s Livelihood.  WGWR, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, December 2003.
Saman, Tieng, Dianna Long and Adam Platt.  Small Arms and Security in Cambodia - Changes and 
Challenges.  WGWR, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, December 2005.
Small Arms Survey.  Stabilizing Cambodia - Small Arms Control and Security Sector Reform. Small Arms 
Survey 2006, Chapter 5. Geneva, Switzerland. Released 26 June 2006.
Sinthey N and Ashby K.  Possibilities to Reduce the Number of Weapons and the Practice of Using 
Weapons to Solve Problems in Cambodia. 1998.
UN DDA. Fact Finding Mission to the Kingdom of Cambodia. New York. 20 June 2002. 
Wille, Christina. European Union Assistance on Curbing Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Kingdom 
of Cambodia: A Case Study on European Action on SALW under the CFSP. In The European Union in 
Small Arms Action. pp 1 - 23. Geneva. UNIDIR. November 2005. 
http://www.unidir.org/pdf/activites/pdf4-act263.pdf
Wille, Christina. Finding the evidence: the links between weapon collection programmes, gun use, and 
homicide rates in Cambodia. Small Arms Survey, Geneva, 24 April 2006 (Draft).
Working Group for Weapons Reduction (WGWR).  Security and Small Arms in Schools.  WGWR, Phnom 
Penh, Cambodia, 2003.
South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse
for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons
Internacionalnih Brigada 56, 11 000 Belgrade, Serbia
Tel. (+381) (11) 344 6353  / Fax. (+381) (11) 344 6356
 URL: www.seesac.org / Email: info@seesac.org
South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse
for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons
SEESAC
Evaluation of the EU Small Arms and 
Light Weapons Assistance to the
Kingdom of Cambodia (EU-ASAC)
9 7 8 8 6 7 7 2 8 0 1 8 5
ISBN 86-7728-018-9 
